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Privileged Access to Financial Innovation 
Cary Martin Shelby* 
Access to private funds is limited to an elite class of investors—
wealthy individuals and large institutions.  Individuals of more modest 
means—“retail investors”—face more limited investment choices; 
generally they can only invest in mutual funds.  Despite this inequitable 
division, the current regulatory climate will lead to an even further 
expansion of the private fund industry.  This Article argues that this 
loosening regulatory climate could lead to a talent drain amongst 
registered funds, could narrow the investment choices available to 
retail investors, and could deepen the already troubling income gap 
between wealthy and average earners.  With respect to a possible talent 
drain, as it becomes easier for issuers to avoid the arduous registration 
requirements of the federal securities laws, many investment advisers 
will simply “go private” by instead offering hedge funds or other 
private investments.  In assessing privileged access to strategies, 
because private funds are permitted to engage in more flexible trading 
strategies through the use of derivatives and other exotic instruments, 
elite investors have better opportunities for wealth maximization and 
diversification.  A large body of empirical research has also found that 
private fund advisers often have privileged access to valuable 
information regarding upcoming investments.  To the extent that this 
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privileged access continues to grow, the options available to retail 
investors will continue to decline.  From a broader perspective, this 
could magnify the financial challenges facing retail investors, some of 
which include dwindling retirement savings and declining property 
values, as well as deepen the already troubling income gap in this 
country.  Alternative frameworks could entail: (1) loosening the capital 
restrictions that apply to mutual funds so that retail investors can 
access a greater degree of financial innovation, or (2) tightening the 
existing freedoms that apply to private funds, so as to level the playing 
field between retail and elite investors.  However, the long-term and 
short-term effects to systemic risk, investor protection, and capital 
formation would have to be thoroughly investigated before adopting any 
proposed solution along this spectrum.  This would necessarily require 
enhanced coordination between the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”), and improved collaboration with related industries (e.g., 
economic, financial, banking, quantitative analysis, etc.). 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Performing in all Conditions” is the phrase that outlines the bottom 
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of the advertisement.1  Just above those words, three snowboarders are 
climbing a tall mountain that is covered in deep layers of snow.2  It is 
evident that they have completed something special.  Their arms wave 
in triumph.  Each snowboarder miraculously persevered despite the 
blistering cold, the threatening mounds of snow, and the mountain’s 
intimidating steepness.  Thoughts of determination and drive are 
automatically elicited by this image.  In fact, this picture seems to 
represent every possible characteristic that could generally be associated 
with success.  At the very top of the page, the words “Balyasny Asset 
Management” are emblazoned in capital letters.3  It is therefore implied 
that something about this firm holds the same promise of success and 
perseverance for a greater number of people: that, similar to these 
snowboarders, this firm can also achieve the impossible by delivering 
superior results under extreme conditions. 
Upon further investigation, one can easily find that this company is a 
highly successful hedge fund that manages a total of approximately $4.3 
billion.4  Although this ad is visible to all members of the general 
public, only a finite number of elite investors can invest with this fund.5  
This elite class of investors includes wealthy individuals and 
institutional investors such as insurance companies, pension plans, and 
endowments.6  Retail investors, which include the legions of individuals 
who do not meet the stringent net worth and income requirements for 
becoming an elite investor, are prohibited from investing directly with 
hedge funds.7  Thus, they are largely excluded from accessing this 
vehicle that promises to “perform in all conditions.” 
Retail investors are mainly stuck with mutual funds, which is an 
industry that is plagued with severe regulatory constraints placed on the 
strategies of such funds.8  These constraints make it difficult for mutual 
funds to consistently beat the market.9  Numerous studies and surveys 
have found that a large percentage of mutual funds have not been able 
 
1. Alexandra Stevenson, With Ban on Ads Removed, Hedge Funds Test Waters, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 20, 2014, 6:12 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/with-ban-on-ads-lifted-hedge-
funds-test-waters/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i) (2015). 
6. These elite investors are legally defined as “accredited investors” under the Securities Act 
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15) (2012) & 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a). 
7. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). 
8. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
9. See discussion infra Part III.B (explaining how the Company Act allows hedge funds to 
circumvent many of the restrictions that are placed on mutual funds). 
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to consistently earn returns that exceed the S&P 500.10  Furthermore, 
restrictions under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Company 
Act”) have historically narrowed the universe of investment options 
available to registered funds.11  They are generally limited to stocks, 
bonds, and cash instruments.  In contrast, private funds have unfettered 
access to innovative products such as derivatives, illiquid instruments, 
distressed securities, and other exotic instruments, which are minimally 
available to registered funds.  The adverse consequences of these 
constraints were most visible during the recent financial crisis, where 
certain hedge funds relied on their increased freedoms to engage in 
short-trading and other innovative strategies to earn a sizable return for 
their underlying investors.12  On the whole, the hedge fund industry 
outperformed the mutual fund industry during the financial crisis of 
2007–10 (commonly known as the “Great Recession”).13  More 
specifically, in 2008, the value of global equities collectively fell “42 
percent while hedge funds worldwide lost a comparatively smaller 19 
percent for their investors.”14  As retail investors face dwindling 
retirement and savings accounts, an increasing retirement age, and 
decreasing property values, the disparities created by this divide become 
more problematic and more difficult to justify.15 
These disparities are exacerbated by a regulatory climate that seems 
to support an even greater expansion of the private fund industry.16 
Although the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 has subjected private funds to 
increased registration requirements under the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940 (“Advisers Act”),17 this Article demonstrates that the current 
 
10. Richard Finger, Five Reasons Your Mutual Fund Probably Underperforms The Market, 
FORBES (Apr. 15, 2013, 9:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardfinger/2013/04/15/five-
reasons-your-mutual-fund-probably-underperforms-the-market/ (referring to a study that found 
“66.08 percent of all domestic equity mutual funds underperformed when matched against the 
S&P 1500”).  See generally Associated Press, FAIL: 84% Of Actively Managed Mutual Funds 
Did Worse Than Their Benchmarks In 2011, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 12, 2012, 8:23 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/84-mutual-funds-underperform-2012-3; Justin Fox, Breaking 
News: Mutual Fund Managers Keep Failing to Beat the Market, TIME (Apr. 20, 2009), 
http://business.time.com/2009/04/20/breaking-news-mutual-fund-managers-keep-failing-to-beat-
the-market/ (“To be precise, 66.21% of actively managed domestic stock funds underperformed 
the S&P Composite 1500 Index in the five years from 2004 through 2008.”). 
11. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
12. Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation and 
Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 244 (2009) (arguing that hedge fund flexibilities 
generally allow such advisers to consistently outperform the broader markets). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 243–44. 
15. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
16. See discussion infra Part II. 
17. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 274–77 (providing a brief description of 
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regulatory environment has now shifted to support an even greater 
expansion of the private fund industry.  For instance, hedge funds can 
now advertise, which is a monumental shift in our regulatory 
paradigm.18  This new power to advertise will likely fuel growth by 
making it easier for private funds to access prospective investors.19  
Congress conferred this new power through the recently passed 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”),20 which also makes 
it easier for private funds to evade “public” status under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).21  In addition, amendments to 
safe harbors provided under the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities 
Act”) have made it easier for investors in private funds to liquidate their 
private investments into cash.22 
Commentators have offered intriguing explanations for this 
phenomenon.  Some attribute this climate to the significant resources 
that private industries employ in lobbying for more lenient 
regulations.23  Professor Zachary Gubler has argued, “the expansion of 
the private securities market can be viewed as a political strategy on the 
part of the SEC to maximize its bureaucratic career support in the face 
of uncertainty over how to reform the dysfunctionality of the public 
market.”24  Our current regulatory climate can be attributed to a number 
of factors, and can even benefit the elite class of investors that have 
access to private funds.25  But it can potentially lead to troubling 
 
new registration requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act). 
18. See discussion infra Part I.B (detailing the elimination of the solicitation ban and its likely 
effects on private investment companies). 
19. Id. 
20. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
21. See discussion infra Part I.D (explaining how the increase in the threshold for the number 
of investors that will trigger public status allows investment companies to avoid periodic 
disclosure requirements). 
22. See discussion infra Part II.C (describing how recent amendments have resulted in shorter 
mandatory holding periods). 
23. Clea Benson & Cheyenne Hopkins, Paulson Leads Hedge-Fund Lobby Push to Privatize 
Fannie, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2013, 11:11 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-30/ 
paulson-leads-hedge-fund-lobby-push-to-privatize-fannie.html; Sarah N. Lynch, US Hedge Fund 
Industry Pushing Derivatives Regulator to Lift Ad Ban, REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2014, 3:28 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/08/usa-hedgefunds-advertising-idUSL2N0JY21R201401 
08; Kevin Spak, Hedge Funds Get ‘Sweet Deal’ in Finance Bill, NEWSER (May 3, 2010, 8:28 
AM), http://www.newser.com/story/87634/hedge-funds-get-sweet-deal-in-finance-bill.html; 
Jenna Staul, Hedge Fund Industry Presses On With New Lobbying Effort, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/16/hedge-fund-industry-
press 
_n_324100.html. 
24. Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. L. 
REV. 745, 796 (2013). 
25. See Cary Martin, One Step Forward for Hedge Fund Investors: The Removal of the 
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outcomes for the general public.  This Article argues that the loosening 
regulatory climate could lead to a talent drain amongst registered funds, 
narrow the investment choices available to retail investors, and deepen 
the already troubling income gap between wealthy and average earners. 
By and large, as it becomes easier for issuers to avoid the arduous 
registration requirements of the federal securities laws, many 
investment advisers will simply “go private” by offering hedge funds or 
other private investments.26  This could lead to a significant drain of 
superior talent for those left behind as managers in the mutual fund 
industry.27  Moreover, the economic disparities created by this growing 
industry have likely trumped the investor protection concerns that have 
historically supported the separation of private and public funds.28  
Because private funds are permitted to engage in more flexible trading 
strategies through the use of leverage and derivatives, such investors 
have better opportunities for wealth maximization and diversification.29  
A large body of empirical research has also found that private fund 
advisers often have privileged access to valuable information regarding 
upcoming investments.30  Fostering a regulatory environment that 
promotes such inequities could further aggravate the financial 
challenges facing retail investors, some of which include dwindling 
retirement savings, declining property values, and a disappearing 
middle class.31  It could also contribute to the growing income divide 
between the wealthy and the average earner in this country.32  Professor 
Thomas Piketty’s national bestseller, Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century, provides an in-depth economic analysis of both the scale and 
the drivers of this growing income gap.33  Generally speaking, this 
deepening divide could hinder economic growth, and lead to political 
 
Solicitation Ban and the Challenges that Lie Ahead, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1143 (2014) [hereinafter 
Martin, One Step Forward]. 
26. See discussion infra Part III (highlighting the ability of hedge funds to avoid many of the 
restrictions placed on mutual funds). 
27. See discussion infra Part II.C (explaining the potential benefits of going private including 
performance fees). 
28. See discussion infra Part IV.A (suggesting that investor protection rationale becomes less 
convincing as private companies extend their reach to the general public). 
29. See discussion infra Part III. 
30. See discussion infra Part III.C (describing the advantage private fund advisers receive 
from the ability to access valuable information). 
31. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
32. See discussion infra Part IV.B (outlining competing views from economists regarding the 
long term implications of inequality among investors). 
33. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 15 (Arthur 
Goldhammer trans., 2014). 
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and social unrest.34  Although it is admittedly difficult to directly 
correlate this divide with our federal securities laws, this Article should 
at least demonstrate that more research is needed in this regard.  At face 
value, it seems unsettling to encourage a regulatory system where top 
earners have access to even greater capital gains through private 
investments, while the general public is left with investments that are 
perhaps subpar. 
Crafting a viable solution highlights the unique challenges of 
applying a reliable cost-benefit analysis to new regulations in light of 
the growing complexities of the financial markets.  Loosening the 
antiquated trading restrictions that apply to mutual fund investments 
would allow advisers to employ strategies that could further protect 
investors in declining markets.  This would create better opportunities 
for wealth maximization and diversification for the general public.  And 
because mutual funds are subject to the detailed registration 
requirements under the Company Act (and other enhancements under 
the Dodd-Frank Act), 35 they may be better suited to trade in such risky 
instruments given the heightened disclosure and governance 
requirements that are designed to protect retail investors.  However, the 
costs to investor protection and market integrity could be monumental, 
particularly because these instruments are often inordinately complex, 
and could expose the broader economy to increased systemic risk. 
Alternatively, specific limitations could be imposed on hedge funds’ 
leverage exposure and speculative trading activities, since the 
overindulgence in these undertakings could expose the general public to 
negative externalities.  However, the costs of limiting such activities 
could unduly constrain capital formation, which is further complicated 
by the fact that pension funds and other institutional investors (that are 
comprised of underlying retail investors) are increasingly investing in 
these vehicles.36  As such, the long-term and short-term effects to 
systemic risk, investor protection, and capital formation would have to 
be thoroughly investigated before adopting any proposed solution along 
this spectrum.  Enhancing coordination between the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (“CFTC”), and improving collaboration with related 
industries (e.g., economic, financial, banking, quantitative analysis, 
 
34. Id. 
35. 15 U.S.C. § 80b–3 (2012). 
36. But see discussion infra text accompanying notes 178–83 (discussing the withdrawal of 
hedge fund investments by the California retirement system agency CalPERS, and the increased 
interest in hedge funds by institutional investors, in spite of CalPERS’ recent withdrawal from the 
industry). 
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etc.), are necessary first steps for deriving an appropriate solution for 
these growing inequities. 
This Article is a continuation of my prior research as I have 
consistently explored, from a variety of perspectives, the extent to 
which investor protection should be reframed to accommodate the 
rampant financial innovation that has occurred in the past decades.37  
This Article seeks to shift gears by focusing on the economic impact to 
retail investors, who have not directly benefited from the loosening of 
restrictions for private funds.  In addition, this piece builds on the 
existing literature on this topic, which has consistently investigated the 
pervasive inequities that naturally derive from this division of 
investors.38  This Article renews this debate within the framework of the 
current regulatory climate of fostering private fund expansion.  It also 
proposes alternative solutions that entail reassessing the caps on 
leverage that currently apply to registered funds and enhancing 
coordination between the SEC and the CFTC to derive more effective 
regulation. 
Part I begins by highlighting the growing prevalence of the 
 
37. See generally Cary Martin, Is Systemic Risk Prevention the New Paradigm?  A Proposal 
to Expand Investor Protection Principles to the Hedge Fund Industry, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 87 
(2012) [hereinafter Martin, Systematic Risk Prevention] (arguing that Dodd-Frank does not 
provide enough information to adequately protect hedge fund investors); Cary Martin, Private 
Investment Companies in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Rethinking the Effectiveness of the 
Sophisticated Investor Exemption, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 49 (2012) [hereinafter Martin, Private 
Investment Companies]. 
38. See Samuel Brunson, Mutual Funds, Fairness, and the Income Gap, 65 ALA. L. REV. 139, 
142 (2013) (focusing on inequitable tax rates between public and private funds as “mutual fund 
investors must pay taxes on non-existent gains, but the wealthy can use alternative investment 
strategies to avoid such taxes, the taxation of mutual funds violates the tax policy objective of 
vertical equity”); Gubler, supra note 24, at 754–68 (arguing that the SEC has implicitly supported 
the expansion of the private market due to uncertainty regarding effective regulation of public 
markets); Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 
3402–06 (2013) (examining the recent emergence of private secondary markets to highlight 
growing disparities among investors and to further illuminate resulting harms to overall markets); 
Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
521, 568–83 (2009) (investigating reform agenda based on the libertarian-paternalist notion that 
government intervention should aim to bolster consumer decision making without undermining 
freedom of choice); Jasmin Sethi, Another Role for Securities Regulation: Expanding Investor 
Opportunity, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 783, 829–36 (2011) (advocating for the inclusion 
of “opportunities for wealth accumulation” analysis, particularly for the average investor, as basis 
for adopting new securities regulations); Houman B. Shadab, Fending for Themselves: Creating a 
U.S. Hedge Fund Market for Retail Investors, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 251, 309 (2008) 
(discussing the economic harms of excluding retail investors from private fund markets but 
proposes the creation of “a retail [Fund of Hedge Funds (“FOHF”)] that raises capital through a 
private placement to an underwriter (or syndicate of underwriters) who, in turn, lists the securities 
of the retail FOHF on a trading platform accessible only by sophisticated investors”). 
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investment company industry.39  This Part continues with a detailed 
explanation of how the current regulatory climate will nurture an even 
greater expansion of the private fund industry.  Part II then explains 
how this future expansion could lead to a drain of talent from public 
funds.40  As the private fund industry has grown easier to access, 
advisers may steer away from the arduous registration requirements of 
mutual funds.  Part III continues this analysis by describing the growing 
inequities that retail investors will likely face with respect to access to 
strategies and information.41  As private funds are granted increasing 
liberties, retail investors will be left with an even smaller universe of 
available strategies and investment options.  Part IV illuminates the 
broader implications of promoting such inequitable access.42  Though 
more research is needed in this regard, such inequities could exacerbate 
the already challenging financial environment facing retail investors.  It 
could also contribute to the growing income gap between the wealthy 
and the average investor.  The Article concludes with brief thoughts 
about the limitations of crafting an immediate solution without first 
enhancing coordination between the SEC and the CFTC and improving 
collaboration with related industries.43 
I.  EXPANSION OF PRIVATE FUND INDUSTRY 
This Part begins by elucidating the vital role that both public and 
private funds play in the financial markets as investors depend on these 
vehicles for a variety of saving mechanisms.  Registered funds still 
account for a larger share of public savings,44 but the prominence of 
private funds has grown exponentially over the years.45  As such, this 
Part proceeds with a detailed explanation of how the current regulatory 
climate will lead to an even greater insurgence of these vehicles.  The 
recently passed JOBS Act and amendments to the omnipresent 
Securities Act have removed many of the restrictions that previously 
applied to private funds. 
A.  Prevalence of Investment Companies 
Investment companies play a dominant role in the public capital 
markets.  Individual retail investors, who directly invest in a range of 
 
39. See infra Part I. 
40. See infra Part II. 
41. See infra Part III. 
42. See infra Part IV. 
43. See infra Part V. 
44. See infra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
45. See infra notes 67–74 and accompanying text. 
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private or public issuers for their own personal accounts, are a dying 
breed.46  An investor who wishes to utilize the public capital markets to 
boost his or her retirement savings would rarely spend time researching 
a plethora of companies for direct investment.  Retail investors instead 
generally allocate their capital to a number of registered investment 
companies such as mutual funds, bond funds, and money market 
funds.47  From a practical perspective, this evolution makes sense as 
these vehicles provide investors with immediate access to expertise, risk 
management, and diversification.48  The advisers that manage such 
companies are presumably comprised of talented individuals who 
possess an astute expertise in financial management.49  These “experts” 
collect investments from a large number of both individual and 
institutional investors and thereby invest that pool in a variety of 
issuers, instruments, and strategies.50  This saves individual investors 
the time and money of having to parse through a seemingly infinite 
number of disclosures related to a range of companies across various 
sectors and concentrations.  Advisers have also aggressively marketed 
their mutual fund products to the general public, which is yet another 
contributing factor to the growth of the industry.51  In exchange for 
managing a mutual fund, such advisers receive significant management 
fees,52 which are typically calculated as a percentage of the total net 
assets of the pool.53 
Mutual funds are the most prevalent category of investment 
 
46. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the 
Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025 (2009) (asserting that the SEC 
faces new challenges as markets have become increasingly institutionalized). 
47. Mutual Funds Can Help Lower Investing Risks, VANGUARD, https://investor.vanguard. 
com/mutual-funds (last visited Sept. 8, 2015); Types of Mutual Funds, AM. FUNDS, 
https://www.americanfunds.com/resources/choices/funds/mutual-funds.html (last visited Sept. 8, 
2015); Ultimate Guide to Retirement, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/retirement/guide/ 
investing_mutualfunds.moneymag/index3.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
48. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, MUTUAL FUNDS: A GUIDE FOR INVESTORS 6 (2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-mutual-funds.pdf [hereinafter MUTUAL FUND 
GUIDE]. 
49. Id. 
50. Id.  But see discussion infra Part II.B (describing how the rise of index funds has undercut 
the need for “expert” management since they rely on computer programs to replicate a basket of 
instruments represented by an index). 
51. See generally infra Part II.B (discussing how growth in the mutual fund industry could be 
attributed to marketing as opposed to “talent”). 
52. John P. Freeman, Stewart L. Brown & Steve Pomerantz, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: 
New Evidence and a Fair Fiduciary Duty Test, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 83, 89–92 (2008) (summarizing 
statistics that prove high profitability of mutual fund managers largely results from management 
fees). 
53. Mutual Fund Fees & Expenses, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/invest 
ment-products/mutual-funds/fees-expenses#Managementfees (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
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companies in the United States, as they are available for investment by 
the general public.  In 2014, the mutual fund industry managed nearly 
$16 trillion in assets.54  Over half of the individuals in the United States 
have direct or indirect investments in mutual funds.55  These individuals 
depend on mutual funds as a saving vehicle for college tuition, 
retirement, and many other major life events.56  Because our federal 
securities laws are rooted in investor protection for the masses, these 
pooled investment companies must register under these laws.57  
Advisers are then required to provide detailed disclosures to their 
underlying investors and comply with numerous governance and 
compliance requirements.58  Registered investment companies are also 
restricted from investing in “riskier” classes of instruments, and from 
leveraging a high percentage of its assets.59  These restrictions are 
designed to protect the underlying investors from overzealous advisers 
who may engage in riskier practices to the detriment of unsuspecting 
investors. 
In contrast, private investment companies include private equity 
funds, venture capital funds, and hedge funds, among others.  These 
companies rely on various exemptions under our intricate, yet evolving, 
web of federal securities laws to maintain greater flexibilities with 
respect to trading strategies, disclosure practices, valuation mechanisms, 
and governance requirements.60  Generally speaking, issuers can 
employ these flexibilities in exchange for restricting investments to 
accredited investors.61  Such investors include natural persons who 
either earn over $200,000 of annual income, or own over $1 million in 
net assets (excluding the value of an individual’s primary residence).62  
 
54. INV. CO. INST., 2014 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND 
ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 26, http://www.icifactbook.org 
/fb_ch2.html#investor. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77mm (2012) (outlining general registration 
requirements); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm; Investment Company 
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(a)(2); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) 
(defining “Investment Adviser”). 
58. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77mm (outlining general registration requirements); id. §§ 78a–
78mm; id. § 80a-1(a)(2); id. § 80b-2(a)(11) (defining “Investment Adviser”). 
59. See discussion infra Part IV.A (explaining unique financial challenges facing retail 
investors). 
60. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE 
FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 8–13 
(2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT] 
(explaining regulatory exemptions upon which hedge funds rely). 
61. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15); 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2015). 
62. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (regulating that under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC can re-
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Accredited investors also include a wide range of institutions such as 
insurance companies, pension plans, endowments, and banks.63  
Theoretically, these investment schemes enjoy greater flexibilities 
because accredited investors have the resources to adequately protect 
themselves.64 
Although these investment companies are in fact private, the private 
fund industry has grown exponentially over the past decades.  For 
example, the total hedge fund industry is comprised of approximately 
18,000 funds,65 and in the United States, the industry manages 
approximately $2.93 trillion.66  In February 2014, investors allocated 
$41 billion of additional capital to hedge fund investments, which is 
“the largest monthly allocation since [eVestment] began tracking 
monthly flows in October 2008.”67  Many investors are flocking to 
hedge funds because they enjoy greater flexibilities to maximize returns 
through derivatives trading and unrestrained leverage, which are 
minimally available to their mutual fund counterparts.68  The New York 
City retirement systems recently made the controversial decision to 
increase its hedge fund investments from $450 million to $3.5 billion,69 
and the Princeton endowment has portioned as much as 25% of its 
portfolio into hedge fund investments.70  This growth has occurred 
despite the increased registration requirements that were implemented 
under the Dodd-Frank Act.71  Overall, the hedge fund industry still 
 
evaluate this definition, as it applies to natural persons, every four years); see also Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. Law 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376. 
§ 413 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b–3(b)) (familiarly known as the “Dodd-Frank 
Act”). 
63. Id. 
64. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). 
65. Hedge Fund Adviser FAQ’s, MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N, http://www.managedfunds.org 
/hedge-fund-investors/faqs/hedge-fund-advisor/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
66. eVestment Data Show Historic Inflows for Hedge Funds in February, MANAGED FUNDS 
ASS’N, (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.managedfunds.org/2014/03/evestment-data-show-historic-
inflows-hedge-funds-february/. 
67. Nina Bains, Welcome Back, Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2014, 9:19 AM), http:// 
blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/03/21/welcome-back-hedge-funds. 
68. See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing the growing income gap).  However, this 
increased flexibility could expose investors, as well as the broader economy, to heightened risks 
given the increased exposure to excessive losses and systemic risk that can result from derivatives 
and leverage.  See discussion infra Part III.C. 
69. Daniel Solin, The New York Pension Plan Folly, USNEWS (Mar. 7, 2013, 10:30 AM), 
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/On-Retirement/2013/03/07/the-new-york-pension-plan-
folly. 
70. Gillian Wee, Princeton Endowment Plans to Cut Ranks of Private-Equity Managers in 
Half, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 21, 2010, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-
22/princeton-endowment-plans-to-cut-ranks-of-private-equity-managers-in-half.html. 
71. See infra Part III.C. at 142 (providing a brief description of new registration requirements 
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plays a major role “on stock, bond, currency, commodity, and other 
markets, and they have been major players in virtually all aspects of 
modern finance, including mortgage lending.”72 
Private equity funds are yet another class of private investment 
companies that have grown in popularity in recent years.  In 2013, 
private equity funds managed approximately $3.5 trillion.73  During this 
same year, the private equity industry experienced the highest aggregate 
amount of capital raised since 2008, with 873 funds reaching a final 
close and raising an aggregate $454 billion.74  There are several types of 
private equity fund structures, some of which include venture capital 
funds, leveraged buyouts, and mezzanine financing.75  For the most 
part, private equity funds invest directly into private companies and 
typically acquire large blocks of illiquid securities.76  Private equity 
funds “are seen as helping create new businesses, fostering innovation 
and assisting businesses in need of restructuring.”77  Private equity 
investors consist of elite and institutional investors who are able to 
invest for long periods of time since such investments often demand 
long holding periods.78  Unlike registered funds, a private equity fund is 
usually a closed-ended vehicle, which means that it does not accept new 
investors once it acquires the majority of its initial capital and it does 
not permit investor withdrawals until the fund dissolves.79 
Given these flexibilities, the private fund industry will continue to 
grow in the coming years.  The Dodd-Frank Act required many hedge 
fund advisers to register under the Advisers Act and gave the SEC the 
power to collect confidential information from such registered 
advisers.80  Many thought that the costs of these new requirements 
 
under the Dodd-Frank Act). 
72. Michael Panzner, Why Are Hedge Funds So Important in Today’s Market?, SEEKING 
ALPHA (Aug. 31, 2007, 4:26 AM),  http://seekingalpha.com/article/46121-why-are-hedge-funds-
so-important-in-todays-market. 
73. 2014 PREQIN GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT, PREQIN 14 (2014), https://www.preqin 
.com/docs/samples/The_2014_Preqin_Global_Private_Equity_Report_Sample_Pages.pdf. 
74. Id. at 70. 
75. THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS: REGULATION 
AND COMPLIANCE § 12.1 (2013). 
76. Private Equity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/privateequity.asp# 
axzz1Q2GK605U (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
77. Andrew J. Donohue, Testimony Concerning Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private 
Investment Pools (July 15, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts071509ajd.htm 
(statement of the Director of Division of Investment Management for the U.S. SEC). 
78. Private Equity, supra note 76. 
79. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 75, at 280. 
80. See infra text accompanying notes 152–54 (providing a brief description of new 
registration requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act). 
MARTIN SHELBY (315-368).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2015  5:16 PM 
328 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  47 
might hinder the growth of the industry.  However, since the passage of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, the regulatory climate has shifted to in fact foster 
the accelerated growth of private funds.  Exemptions provided under the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act have recently been retooled.81  
Under these revisions, private funds can now advertise to the general 
public, can more easily evade “public” status under the Exchange Act, 
and can provide private investors with greater liquidity through newly 
created exchanges for private shares.82 
B.  Advertising 
The JOBS Act was enacted under the Obama Administration on April 
5, 2012.83  One of the most notable components of the JOBS Act is its 
elimination of the solicitation ban for private companies that rely on 
Rule 506 of Regulation D.84  As background, this rule was crafted by 
the SEC in 1982 to provide clarity to issuers who wanted to rely on the 
Section 4(2) exemption under the Securities Act.85  Under Section 4(2), 
issuers could avoid the arduous disclosure requirements associated with 
offering securities (as defined under the Securities Act) if such 
transactions did not involve a “public” offering.86 
 The logic of this provision was quite simple.  If an offering did not 
affect the general public, then there was no need for public disclosures 
and other kinds of protections.87  Under these circumstances, the costs 
of registering an initial offering of securities would far exceed any 
potential benefits, particularly if there was no risk of harm to the public 
capital markets.  In passing the statute in 1933, Congress did little to 
provide a specific definition of what exactly a “public” offering 
entailed.88  The SEC and the courts did provide additional clarity as to 
the contours of a “public” offering, but issuers still faced significant 
uncertainty in legitimately crafting a private placement.89  Regulation D 
 
81. See infra Part I.D (discussing how changes made it easier for private companies to avoid 
the cumbersome registration requirements). 
82. See infra Part I.D (discussing the effects of the JOBS Act provisions). 
83. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
84. Id. § 201(a), 126 Stat. 306 at 313. 
85. See Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited 
Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 24 SEC Docket 1166 (Mar. 8, 1982) (debuting 
the uniform notice of sales to be used for all offerings). 
86. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2012). 
87. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, H.R. REP. NO. 73–85, at 5 (1933). 
88. Id. 
89. Martin, Private Investment Companies, supra note 37, at 65–67 (describing the evolution 
of the sophisticated investor doctrine which presumes that sophisticated investors can fend for 
themselves). 
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was promulgated by the SEC in response to the ambiguities presented 
by these previous tests.  This rule essentially provides bright-line safe 
harbors to prevent issuers from inadvertently engaging in a public 
offering.90   
 Rule 506 is the most permissive exemption provided for under 
Regulation D.  It allows private issuers to raise an unlimited amount of 
capital and offer interests to an unlimited number of accredited 
investors.91  The other exemptions provided under Regulation D place 
ceilings on the total amount of capital that an issuer can accept from 
investors.92  For example, under Rule 504 an issuer cannot accept more 
than $1 million from prospective investors in a single private offering.93  
Under Rule 505, issuers cannot accept more than $5 million.94  In 
exchange, however, vehicles relying on Rule 506 prior to the JOBS Act 
were prohibited from advertising their exempt offerings to the general 
public.95  This restriction was designed to prevent retail investors from 
accidentally investing in such funds, to preserve the private nature of 
these entities, and to perhaps restrict the size of the industry.96 
This advertising restriction encompassed a wide range of both direct 
and indirect communications between private issuers and prospective 
investors.97  A private issuer could lose its Rule 506 exemption by 
communicating any aspect of its underlying business to the press, by 
mentioning a fund name in an interview, or by maintaining informative 
websites regarding its offerings or investment strategies.98  Given this 
broad restriction on communications with prospective investors, issuers 
relying on Rule 506 were only allowed to solicit investors with which 
they had a sufficient preexisting relationship.99  Such preexisting 
relationships are deemed sufficient if the nature of the relationship 
enables the issuer (or person acting on its behalf) to be aware of the 
financial circumstances or sophistication of the persons with whom the 
relationship exists.100  The issuer must also acquire this relationship 
 
90. Martin, One Step Forward, supra note 25, at 1145. 
91. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015). 
92. Martin, One Step Forward, supra note 25, at 1151. 
93. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. §§ 230.506, 502(c). 
96. Id. § 230.502(c). 
97. Id. 
98. See generally Martin, One Step Forward, supra note 25, at Part II.A (explaining the rules 
that provided issuers with clear standards as to whether companies were acting as private 
vehicles). 
99. In re Kenman Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 21962 (1982). 
100. Mineral Lands Research & Mktg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 5568055694 
MARTIN SHELBY (315-368).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2015  5:16 PM 
330 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  47 
before the terms of the offering are created and before the contemplated 
offering begins.101  As a result, hedge funds would often restrict 
marketing activities to personal or close networks of potential investors 
with which they already had a relationship.102 
If an issuer did not have access to these kinds of preexisting 
relationships with accredited investors, it could simply contract for such 
access from registered financial intermediaries, such as brokers or 
placement agents.103  When utilizing this option, “funds enter into 
formal placement arrangements with major investment firms such as 
Morgan Stanley, [or] Merrill Lynch. . . . These firms are typically 
compensated through a placement fee or sales charge . . . .”104  This 
practice has been deemed legally sound by the SEC as these 
intermediaries are simply soliciting investors who have a general 
interest in investing in private placements.105  These solicitations often 
take the form of online suitability questionnaires, which are designed to 
determine whether a prospective investor qualifies as accredited under 
Rule 501.106 
With this new ability to advertise, hedge fund advisers will no longer 
be constrained by the previous requirement to have a preexisting 
relationship with an investor before making a sales pitch.  Nor will they 
be forced to forge a relationship with a placement agent to purchase 
access to pools of accredited investors.  They will now have the ability 
to publicly advertise their products on their respective websites, to 
create elaborate marketing campaigns targeted towards an elite group of 
investors, to recruit such investors at industry seminars and meetings, 
and to disseminate informative and detailed publications in a variety of 
mediums.  These new freedoms will essentially allow hedge funds to 
communicate with a larger range of prospective investors. 
The resulting growth of this new power to advertise will likely be 
profound.  The freedom to advertise will make it easier for smaller, 
emerging funds to more easily access this market.107  The solicitation 
 
(Nov. 4, 1985). 
101. Id. 
102. Darian Capital Services Blog, Impact of “Private Fund” Advertising, INV. FUND 
COMPLIANCE & DISTRIBUTION NEWS (July 16, 2013), http://blog.dariancs.com/2013/07/16/ 
impact-of-private-fund-advertising. 
103. E.F. Hutton & Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 3, 1985); see also Bateman Eichler, Hill 
Richards, SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55680 (Dec. 3, 1985). 
104. Ethan W. Johnson, Hedge Fund Marketing Overview, 7 J. INV. COMPLIANCE, no. 2, 
2006, at 48. 
105. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015). 
106. IPOnet, SEC No-Action Letter (July 26, 1996). 
107. ALI Webinar, Hedge Fund Marketing: Understanding the JOBS Act, AM. L. INST. 6, 7 
MARTIN SHELBY (315-368).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2015  5:16 PM 
2015] Privileged Access to Financial Innovation 331 
ban made it difficult for such funds to effectively compete with their 
larger, more established counterparts, many of which have throngs of 
investors waiting to invest.108  Under the prior regime, this system of 
“paying for access” was often referred to as an “old boys club” that 
thrived on insider privilege and exclusivity.109  Consequently, the 
solicitation ban made it difficult for such funds to raise sufficient capital 
to access an accredited investor audience.  With respect to the larger 
funds, this new opportunity for hedge funds to engage in healthy 
competition could give the more prominent advisers the tools to 
successfully bolster their brands to a wider audience.110  The hedge 
fund industry can greatly benefit from these resulting increases to 
transparency and competition.  Yet, the indirect effects that this 
exponential growth could have on the broader retail market remain 
subject to further investigation. 
C.  Liquidity Enhancements 
The exemptions provided under Regulation D also mandate 
significant liquidity restrictions on shares resold in the secondary 
market.  More specifically, accredited investors who purchase such 
private placement shares are restricted from reselling these shares to 
subsequent purchasers.111  From a policy perspective, this restriction 
prevents accredited investors from dumping private securities on an 
uninformed public.112  If an accredited investor is permitted to freely 
 
(2012), http://thehfa.org/documents/FG/hfa/documents/233881_JOBSact.pdf (“All four panelists 
agreed that the JOBS Act will have the greatest effect on emerging managers, including both 
small and midsize managers looking for increased exposure and AUM, as well as start-ups.”); 
Letter from the Hedge Fund Ass’n to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y of Sec. Exch. Comm’n (June 
6, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-22.pdf; Small and Large Hedge 
Fund Managers View JOBS Act Through Different Lens, HEDGE FUND MARKETING ALLIANCE 
(July 11, 2012), http://www.hedgefundmarketing.org/small-and-large-hedge-fund-managers-view 
-jobs-act-through-different-lens/. 
108. Amit Chokshi, Hedge Fund Marketing’s Gray Area, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 2, 2010, 2:26 
AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/185671-hedge-fund-marketings-gray-area; Susan Lyon, The 
Hedge Fund Advertising Ban Lifted: What Should Investors Know?, NERD WALLET (July 24, 
2013), http://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/investing/2013/sec-hedge-fund-advertising-ban-lifted/ 
(quoting Peter Turchan, Partner at Ready to Run Designs, “I think that the recent lift will not 
cause drastic change to the industry or greatly effect [sic] investors, but will offer lesser known 
funds to compete on a larger scale and reach a larger audience of potential investors”). 
109. Letter from Tom Dworzanski to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y of Sec. Exch. Comm’n 
(June 7, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-23.pdf. 
110. ALI Webinar, supra note 107, at 97–98. 
111. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2015). 
112. Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 468 (2d Cir. 1959) (stating that restricting 
resales deters the following scenario: “[A] dealer who speculatively purchases an unregistered 
security in the hope that the financially weak issuer had, as is stipulated here, ‘turned the corner,’ 
to unload on the unadvised public what he later determines to be an unsound investment without 
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engage in the reselling of private placement securities, then the 
subsequent purchasers would not have access to the public disclosures 
and protections that would otherwise be available in a registered 
offering.113  If an accredited investor does in fact resell private 
securities to the general public, such accredited investor could be 
deemed an underwriter.114  This would automatically trigger the 
registration requirements under the Securities Act and the entire 
transaction would lose its Regulation D exemption.115  An accredited 
investor in this scenario could avoid these harsh results by holding the 
private securities for at least two years before reselling them, or by 
restricting resells to other accredited investors.116 
The SEC provided additional clarity to these restrictions when it 
promulgated the Rule 144 safe harbor in 1972.117  Rule 144 initially 
adopted the common law standard of mandating a holding period of two 
years.118  In 1997, however, the SEC reduced the holding period to one 
year so that private securities were no longer deemed “restricted” after 
complying with this reduced holding period.119  Thus, accredited 
investors could freely resell their shares in the secondary market to the 
investing public after holding the securities for one year.120  This 
holding period requirement presumes that the accredited investors 
purchased such securities with the intent to make a legitimate 
investment, as opposed to purchasing with the intent to distribute to the 
investing public (by inadvertently acting as an underwriter).121  Rule 
144 also clarified when this holding period actually began,122 and 
provided additional guidance for any notice or disclosure requirements, 
as well as any restrictions on the volume and manner of selling 
restricted securities.123 
In 2008, the SEC amended Rule 144 to provide accredited investors 
 
the disclosure sought by the securities laws, although it is in precisely such circumstances that 
disclosure is most necessary and desirable.”). 
113. Id. 
114. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11) (2012). 
115. Id. 
116. Ackerberg v. Johnson, Jr., 892 F.2d 1328, 1335–37 (8th Cir. 1989). 
117. Definition of Terms “Underwriter” and “Brokers’ Transactions,” Securities Act Release 
No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972). 
118. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2015). 
119. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 
634 (3rd ed. 2012). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(3). 
123. Id. § 230.144(c), (e), (f). 
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with even more liquidity for their private placement investments.124  
Accredited investors wanted to enjoy the freedoms of quickly reselling 
their shares to subsequent purchasers, especially if such investments had 
significantly appreciated in value.  Profiting from capital appreciation is 
one of the primary benefits of owning shares, and loosening the 
mandated holding period of private securities could induce greater 
investments in private offerings.  As such, the 2008 amendments 
shortened the required holding period for private investments to six 
months.125  Accredited investors no longer had to wait an entire year 
before reselling their shares to the investing public. 
The SEC completely eliminated the required holding period for a 
certain subset of investors when it adopted the Rule 144A safe 
harbor.126  Under this rule, accredited investors can immediately resell 
their shares a Qualified Institutional Buyer (“QIB”) without being 
subject to any mandated holding period.127  QIBs include entities that in 
the aggregate, own and invest on a discretionary basis $100 million or 
more in securities of companies unaffiliated with QIBs.128  This class of 
investors can include qualifying insurance companies, investment 
companies, corporations, and partnerships.129  Conceptually, these kinds 
of investors should be able to adequately fend for themselves and thus 
do not need the protections afforded by a mandated holding period.  The 
SEC passed this safe harbor after facing growing pressures to expand 
the private placement market, which also served to attract foreign 
issuers that did not wish to be burdened by the severe liquidity 
restrictions placed on private placements previously.130  Many of these 
issuers simply decided to offer interests in other countries that had 
looser restrictions.131  Rule 144A served to retain or recruit a larger 
number of both domestic and foreign issuers to bolster capital formation 
in the United States.132 
Financial innovation has naturally led to the creation of private 
trading platforms, where prequalified accredited investors, and QIBs, 
 
124. Id. § 230.144(d). 
125. Id. 
126. See generally id. § 230.144A (enumerating such safe harbors). 
127. Id. § 230.144A(b), (d). 
128. Id. § 230.144A(a)(i). 
129. Id. 
130. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of Rule 144A Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
409, 411 (2008). 
131. Paul G. Mahoney, Regulation of International Securities Issues, 14 CATO REV. BUS. & 
GOV’T 62, 64 (1991). 
132. Id. 
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can freely trade restricted securities.133  Before these trading platforms 
existed, such investors faced challenges in identifying willing buyers 
and sellers of private securities even if no holding period was required.  
On March 5, 2014, NASDAQ announced the launching of a new trading 
platform, the NASDAQ Private Market.134  Various categories of 
private issuers, such as hedge funds, venture capital funds, and general 
private placements, can become members of this new platform.135  Once 
a private issuer becomes a member, its underlying investors can 
exchange shares with other investors via this new exchange.136  The 
NASDAQ press release provides, 
“We are excited to officially open NASDAQ Private Market for 
business,” said Greg Brogger, President of NASDAQ Private Market.  
“We listened to the needs of private growth companies and developed 
NASDAQ Private Market to serve as a fully integrated end-to-end 
solution for managing their equity functions.  NASDAQ Private 
Market will bring liquidity, efficiency and control to private 
companies.  Member broker-dealers and their investor clients will 
benefit from greater access to financial information, transaction flow 
and liquidity.”137 
In effect, these platforms, or exchanges, are making it easier for 
private issuers to attract a greater number of investors as they can now 
promise such investors the freedom to easily trade their shares. 
The loosening of the liquidity constraints provided under safe harbors 
144 and 144A, coupled with the creation of private exchanges and 
trading platforms for restricted securities, will likely facilitate an even 
greater expansion of the private fund industry.  Immediate liquidity was 
previously the distinguishing characteristic of registered investment 
companies, since mutual funds are obligated to honor purchases and 
redemptions on a daily basis.138  As immediate liquidity becomes easier 
for private investment companies to guarantee, they will be more 
appealing to a larger group of accredited investors.  This could in turn 
lead to a decreased demand for mutual fund investments. 
 
133. See generally Rodrigues, supra note 38 (providing analysis of burgeoning secondary 
markets for private placement shares). 
134. NASDAQ Private Market Launches New Marketplace for Private Companies, NASDAQ 
(Mar. 5, 2014), http://ir.nasdaqomx.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=830434. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(b) (2015); see also Invest Wisely: An Introduction to Mutual 
Funds, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm (last updated 
July 2, 2008) (“Mutual fund investors can readily redeem their shares at the current NAV—plus 
any fees and charges assessed on redemption-at any time.”). 
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D.  Exchange Act Registration 
The Exchange Act was passed in 1934.139  While the Securities Act 
mandates detailed disclosure requirements for an initial public offering 
(“IPO”) (the primary capital market), the Exchange Act creates 
additional disclosure obligations for shares traded on the secondary 
market.140  Once an issuer, or underwriter acting on the issuer’s behalf, 
sells the full allotment of shares in an IPO, the disclosure obligations 
provided under the Securities Act no longer apply.  Even still, once 
these same IPO shares enter the secondary market where investors are 
trading shares amongst each other, the ongoing disclosure and reporting 
obligations under the Exchange Act are automatically triggered.141  
Public companies must comply with these periodic disclosure 
requirements for at least one year following their effective registration 
date.142  The ongoing disclosure obligations include the public filing of 
annual and quarterly reports (Forms 10-K and 10-Q, respectively), 
which contain any material information related to the underlying 
company as well as annual and interim financial statements.143  
Companies must also provide close to real-time disclosure of specified 
material events provided in the Form 8-K.144 
In 1964, Congress expanded the Exchange Act’s scope of what 
constituted a “public company” under its provisions by adopting Section 
12(g).145  This new provision sought to incorporate a larger range of 
companies that had a substantial impact on interstate commerce, even if 
such companies did not directly engage in a registered IPO.146  The 
registration requirements under Section 12(g) are triggered based on the 
size and impact of the company.147  More specifically, any company 
that held at least $10 million in total assets and offered interests to 500 
shareholders of record for any class of equity securities had to register 
under the Exchange Act.148  Section 12(g) pulled many large private 
companies into the Exchange Act’s regulatory rubric.  With respect to 
the hedge fund industry, while many funds successfully maintained 
 
139. Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012). 
140. Id. § 78l. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. § 78m. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. § 78l. 
146. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 119, at 172. 
147. See generally Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in 
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 386 (2013) 
(explaining specific contours of Section 12(g) requirements and corresponding exemptions). 
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78l. 
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exemptions under the Securities Act and the Company Act, if a 
particular fund grew to at least $10 million (which was more likely than 
not) and held at least 500 investors, it would have to register under the 
Exchange Act.149  To avoid this scenario, many funds simply restricted 
their funds to 499 investors or less.150 
In 2012, the JOBS Act retooled Section 12(g) to make it easier for 
private companies to avoid the cumbersome and costly registration 
requirements under the Exchange Act.151  The amendment increased the 
500-shareholder registration threshold to 2000 shareholders (or 500 
unaccredited investors).152  Thus, companies can now offer interests to 
1999 investors without having to comply with the periodic disclosure 
requirements mandated under the Exchange Act.153  With respect to the 
private fund industry, these vehicles can now recruit 1999 accredited 
investors and still maintain exemptions under the Securities Act, the 
Company Act (Section 3(c)(7)), and the recently revised Exchange 
Act.154  Many private funds will likely take advantage of this new 
flexibility to recruit a larger number of investors without having to file 
periodic reports with the SEC. 
Overall, the current regulatory climate seems to support the 
expansion of the private fund industry.  Provisions under the JOBS Act 
reversed the advertising ban for private companies and increased the 
investor threshold for registration under the Exchange Act.  Private fund 
advisers will now be able to market their products in the public sphere, 
although they can more easily avoid being identified as a “public” 
company under the Exchange Act.  Liquidity for private shares has also 
been enhanced through the expansion of safe harbors provided under 
the Securities Act, and through the development of private exchanges 
where investors can more easily liquidate their investments.  It is 
difficult to predict with certainty the full impact that these regulatory 
developments will have on future growth of hedge funds, private equity 
funds, and other pooled investment vehicles that are reserved for elite 
investors.  Yet, given the increasing difficulties of “beating the market” 
through the restrictive strategies that constrain public companies (as will 
 
149. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 60, at 13. 
150. Id. 
151. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306, 325 
(2012); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(A). 
152. Martin E. Lybecker, The Effect of the JOBS Act on Private Investment Companies: 
Foreseen Consequences, A.B.A. (May 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2012/ 
05/06_lybecker.html. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
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be further discussed in subsequent Parts), issuers are more likely to take 
advantage of the flexibilities associated with launching a private fund.  
This growth could arguably benefit the elite class of investors by 
creating a more competitive, transparent, and liquid market.  However, 
the long-term impact on the retail investor population has yet to be 
sufficiently investigated.  The remaining Parts of this Article seek to at 
least begin this discussion with a summary of the practical and 
theoretical implications that this burgeoning industry will have for 
investments available to the general public. 
II.  TALENT DRAIN 
This Part begins by identifying the various ways in which adviser 
skill is measured.  Education, past experience, and more importantly, 
the ability to generate consistent alpha, are all specific factors utilized in 
evaluating adviser talent.  Part II then illustrates how the expansion of 
the private fund industry could drain superior talent from the mutual 
fund industry, leaving the general public with subpar management.  
This is compounded by the already limited incentives that public fund 
advisers have with respect to selecting optimal investments and 
receiving optimal fees. 
A.  Measuring Adviser Skill 
Mutual funds are typically managed by an investment adviser entity 
that is registered under the Advisers Act.155  This entity is considered 
the “brain” of the fund as it is responsible for developing and 
implementing its underlying investment strategy.156  These specialized 
strategies are presumably the most important characteristic of a fund as 
they hold the key to earning a sizable return for a large group of 
investors.  Mutual fund strategies are typically comprised of a variety of 
equities, bonds, and cash instruments, which are bought and sold by 
advisers in order to earn returns for investors.157  Determining whether 
a manager can effectually administer its underlying strategy is 
paramount to deciding whether to invest in a particular fund. 
The specific individuals responsible for this imperative function are 
known as the portfolio managers.  Unique talents of such managers can 
be measured by a variety of factors such as educational pedigree and 
 
155. MUTUAL FUND GUIDE, supra note 48, at 6. 
156. Id. (noting that mutual fund advisers are also subject to oversight by the board of 
directors, which helps mitigate potential conflicts of interest between the fund and the adviser). 
157. Id. at 7. 
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previous experience managing comparable investment products.158  
Investors can also investigate any prior lawsuits or enforcement actions 
that have been instituted against a particular adviser or portfolio 
manager.159  Since mutual fund advisers are required to register under 
the Advisers Act, much of this information can be found in the publicly 
available Form ADV.160  This form includes descriptions of the 
advisory services offered, material conflicts of interest, any pending 
disciplinary actions, advisory fees charged, and other general business 
descriptions.161 
Although these characteristics are extremely important in evaluating 
the perceived talent of a particular adviser, investors tend to focus on an 
adviser’s ability to generate alpha, which is the excess return a fund 
earns relative to a specified benchmark, such as the S&P 500 Index.162  
Generally speaking, alpha “is often considered to represent the value 
that a portfolio manager adds to or subtracts from a fund’s return.”163  
Investors can use the mandated performance data provided in a fund’s 
publicly available prospectus to calculate alpha and further investigate 
how a particular fund has performed relative to comparable products or 
vehicles.164  A portfolio manager’s ability to pick the ideal basket of 
securities, as well as to know when to buy and sell such securities (to 
profit from capital appreciation), largely dictates whether a fund will be 
profitable.165 
 
158. Protect Your Money: Check Out Brokers and Investment Advisers, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/investor/brokers.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
159. Id. 
160. Id.; see also Form ADV, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/answers 
/formadv.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (“Form ADV is the uniform form used by investment 
advisers to register with both the SEC and state securities authorities.  The form consists of two 
parts.  Part 1 requires information about the investment adviser’s business, ownership, clients, 
employees, business practices, affiliations, and any disciplinary events of the adviser or its 
employees . . . .  Part 2 requires investment advisers to prepare narrative brochures written in 
plain English that contain information such as the types of advisory services offered, the adviser’s 
fee schedule, disciplinary information, conflicts of interest, and the educational and business 
background of management and key advisory personnel of the adviser.”). 
161. See Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b–4 (c)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (explaining 
the requirements for record keeping and maintenance in order to comply with the Commission). 
162. INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/alpha.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 
2015). 
163. Id. 
164. MUTUAL FUND GUIDE, supra note 48, at 17–19.  It should, however, be noted that past 
performance is not necessarily indicative of future results.  There is an ongoing risk that the 
adviser will not be able to replicate past performance.  Id. 
165. Mutual Funds, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/investors/mutual-
funds (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (“[W]hen the fund’s underlying stocks or bonds pay income 
from dividends or interest, the fund pays those profits, after expenses, to its shareholders in 
payments known as income distributions. . . . [W]hen the fund has capital gains from selling 
MARTIN SHELBY (315-368).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2015  5:16 PM 
2015] Privileged Access to Financial Innovation 339 
B.  Limited Incentives of Mutual Fund Advisers: Stock Picking 
Numerous commentators have queried whether mutual fund advisers 
are sufficiently talented to effectively generate returns over time.166  
Many have come to the troubling conclusion that the profits earned by 
advisers, if any, are solely attributable to luck.167  This is consistent 
with the efficient market hypothesis, which posits that all publicly 
available information regarding a particular security is automatically 
impounded into its price.168  Pursuant to this theory, traders cannot 
expect to consistently earn profits by reacting to newly released 
information related to their holdings.  Such advisers simply collect 
handsome fees from investors, without having the means to actually 
beat the markets on a consistent basis.  In contrast, a more recent study 
found that mutual fund advisers did in fact rely on unique skills such as 
stock picking and market timing to consistently create value for 
investors.169  This study concluded that “the average mutual fund adds 
value by extracting about $2 million a year from financial markets . . . .  
Funds that have added value in the past keep adding value in the future, 
for as long as 10 years.”170  The study also found “that investors 
recognize this skill and reward it by investing more capital with better 
funds.”171 
The inconsistencies of these findings are attributable to a variety of 
factors, one of which relates to the different metrics used to measure 
adviser skill.172  Thus, determining whether fund advisers can 
 
investments in its portfolio at a profit, it passes on those after-expense profits to shareholders as 
capital gains distributions.”). 
166. See generally Rodrigues, supra note 38 (discussing the implications of the disparities in 
the growing income gap). 
167. Id. 
168. John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure 
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 737 (1984); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. 
Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
761, 763 (1985). 
169. Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Measuring Skill in the Mutual Fund 
Industry, 118 J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2015–16). 
170. Id. (manuscript at 1). 
171. Id. 
172. See Malcolm Baker et al., Can Mutual Fund Managers Pick Stocks?  Evidence from 
Their Trades Prior to Earnings Announcements, 45 J. FIN & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 1111 
(explaining that stock-picking skill of mutual fund managers are based on the earnings 
announcement returns of the stocks that they hold and trade); see also Jonathan B. Berk, Five 
Myths of Active Portfolio Management, 31 J. OF PORTFOLIO MGMT. 27, 31 (2005) (“[R]eturns 
cannot be used to measure managerial skill.  Because researchers generally use return to measure 
skill, they have drawn the erroneous conclusion that active managers add little value.”); Berk & 
van Binsbergen, supra note 169, manuscript at 1–2 (states the following regarding the various 
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consistently beat the markets is a highly contested topic that warrants 
further analysis.173  This Article does not attempt to provide a definitive 
answer to this perpetual debate, but it does highlight how the capital 
restrictions provided under the Company Act present yet an additional 
barrier for mutual funds to consistently beat the markets.  More 
specifically, mutual fund advisers are subject to a complex web of 
capital restrictions under the Company Act, which limits the kinds of 
instruments and strategies that an adviser can select for potential 
investment opportunities.174  Mutual funds are therefore restricted to 
securities, bonds, and cash instruments.175  Advisers’ talent is 
essentially limited to a narrow slice of the total universe of investments.  
If advisers had more freedoms to transact in derivatives and other 
innovative financial products, they could perhaps be better incentivized 
to extend their stock-picking and market-timing skills to a larger variety 
of instruments.  Having greater access to these instruments could also 
help advisers ensure returns in declining markets, and develop more 
innovative techniques for actually beating the market on a consistent 
basis.  The limitations provided under the Company Act also narrow 
advisers’ view of the interconnectedness of the markets.  Further, an in-
depth understanding of the relationship between certain derivatives and 
securities markets could perhaps enhance the abilities of advisers to 
better predict market movements. 
It should however be noted that the Company Act was originally 
designed to restrict such access to innovative products because they can 
expose the general public to excessive losses.176  Increased returns 
generally result from increased risks and the federal securities laws are 
fundamentally designed to protect the general public against excessive 
harms.  Because derivatives are inherently leveraged financial products, 
trading in these instruments can result in losses that far exceed the 
 
metrics used to measure alpha: “prior studies have used the net alpha to investors, i.e., the average 
abnormal return net of fees and expenses, to assess whether or not managers have skill . . . .  
Some people have hypothesized . . . that the gross alpha . . . (the average abnormal return before 
fees are subtracted) would be the correct measure of managerial skill. . . . We argue that the skill 
of a mutual fund manager equals the value his fund extracts from markets.”). 
173. Berk & van Binsbergen, supra note 169, manuscript at 1 (“[A]n extensive literature in 
financial economics has focused on the question of whether stock picking or market timing talent 
exists.  Interestingly, the literature has not been able to provide a definitive answer to this 
question.”). 
174. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
175. MUTUAL FUND GUIDE, supra note 48, at 7. 
176. Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a–1(b)(7).  In outlining the policy goals of the 
Company Act, Congress declared that “the interest of investors are adversely affected . . . when 
investment companies by excessive borrowing and the issuance of excessive amounts of senior 
securities increase unduly the speculative character of their junior securities.”  Id. 
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initial investment that underlies the contract.  Moreover, these 
instruments are often highly complex, which makes understanding the 
accompanying risks even more difficult.  It is undoubtedly arguable that 
certain categories of financial innovation should be limited to investors 
who could adequately protect themselves from extreme losses. 
Even still, simply loosening (not eliminating) the existing caps on 
derivatives and leverage could be warranted given the increased need to 
diversify investments across a range of instruments and strategies.177  
Restricting direct access to financial innovation is becoming harder to 
justify as the dividing line between public and private investment 
companies has started to erode.  More specifically, defined benefit 
pension plans have become major investors in the private fund industry 
even though retail investors are the underlying constituents of such 
plans.178  If the general public has indirect exposure to private funds 
through pension plan investments, then it is plausible that mutual funds 
should also have comparable access.  Mutual funds currently dominate 
the investment options available to retail investors through 401(k)s and 
other savings vehicles.179  Whereas CalPERS, the California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System, recently made the widely known 
decision to withdraw its allocations from hedge funds,180 a recent 
survey administered by Quinnipiac University School of Business, 
found that institutional investors still largely favor private fund 
 
177. See generally Rodrigues, supra note 38 (discussing the implications of the disparities in 
the growing income gap). 
178. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS 4–5 (2011). 
179. See JACOB HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE ASSAULT OF AMERICAN JOBS, 
FAMILIES, HEALTH CARE, AND RETIREMENT AND HOW YOU CAN FIGHT BACK 109–35 (2006) 
(providing a brief history of the vast brokerage loans and stock purchased between 1927 and 
1929, which created the corporate surplus before the Great Depression).  Over the past few 
decades, many companies have abandoned defined benefit pension plans and have instead opted 
for independently managed 401(k)s.  Id. at 111.  As background, these kinds of plans guarantee a 
lifetime stream of fixed payments upon retirement.  Such plans have also become major investors 
in the private fund universe as ensuring returns in equities markets has become increasingly 
difficult.  U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 178, at 4–5.  However, defined benefit pension plans 
(like CalPERS) are a dying breed as employers have opted for the more easily administered 
defined contribution plans.  HACKER, supra, at 111.  These plans, which frequently take the form 
of a 401(k), are independently managed by individual employees, who have the freedom to 
choose the basket of investments within their portfolios.  Id.  These plans only guarantee the 
amount invested, as well as any resulting profits or losses from the underlying investments.  
401(k)s rarely include private funds as available investment options.  U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra 
note 178, at 4–9.  They are mostly comprised of mutual fund investments.  HACKER, supra, at 
119. 
180. James B. Stewart, Hedge Funds Lose Calpers, and More, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/business/in-calperss-departure-a-watershed-moment-for-
hedge-funds.html. 
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investments.181  This survey gathered responses from institutional 
investors that collectively manage $1.12 trillion in assets.182  The 
survey yielded the following results: 
While our respondents may be bullish on U.S. equities, they do not 
plan on allocating additional capital to these managers during the next 
year.  However, they do wish to increase their allocations to hedge 
fund and private equity managers.  These anticipated allocation 
decisions suggest that the alternative investment industry will continue 
to grow into the near future.183 
These findings support the notion that investors still seek private fund 
investments to diversify their portfolios and maximize returns. 
To the extent that a particular strategy could generate excessive 
systemic risk, regulators should perhaps subject such funds to 
heightened scrutiny that exceeds the existing regulatory framework for 
private funds.184  This would entail creating precise measures of 
systemic risk, as well as corresponding limitations, that go beyond the 
disclosure framework implemented under the Dodd-Frank Act.  It is 
equally difficult to justify a framework where private entities, with 
limited transparency and governance restrictions, have the market 
capabilities to create negative externalities that could expose the general 
public to harm.  And because mutual funds are subject to the detailed 
registration requirements under the Company Act (and other 
enhancements under the Dodd-Frank Act), they may be better suited to 
trade in such risky instruments given the heightened disclosure and 
governance requirements that are designed to protect retail investors.  
These provisions could serve to mitigate systemic risk as the resulting 
transparency can “weed out” trading activities that are in fact harmful to 
the broader economy. 
One could also argue that contrary to the prior assertions, the steady 
growth of the mutual fund industry over the past century proves that 
mutual fund advisers are indeed talented. Advisers have indeed been 
quite successful in recruiting an ongoing stream of new investors.  But 
recruiting investors in this regard could be attributed to superior sales 
tactics as opposed to having superior talents in optimizing returns.  This 
is supported by the fact that mutual funds have historically had the 
 
181. See generally QUINNIPIAC UNIV., INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SURVEY FALL 2014 (2014). 
182. Id. at 1. 
183. Id. at 3. 
184. See generally Martin, Private Investment Companies, supra note 37 (discussing problems 
associated with relying on the sophisticated investor exemption to separate private and public 
investment companies and queries whether the dividing line should be based on underlying 
investment activities as opposed to the status of investors). 
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freedom to advertise to the general public, and private funds have not 
enjoyed these liberties prior to the passage of the JOBS Act.185  Mutual 
fund advisers have entire marketing teams dedicated to generating 
advertisements across various media.  There are countless commercials, 
broadcasts, articles, websites, and pamphlets, all of which urge the 
general public to invest in mutual funds. 
Professor John Morley of Yale Law School has provided a useful 
historical perspective on this topic in his article, Collective Branding 
and the Origins of Investment Management Regulation: 1936-1942.186  
His research suggests that the early business models of mutual funds 
were historically designed to earn profits from new shareholder 
investments as opposed to generating profits from existing holdings.187  
Because of this early emphasis on sales, the mutual fund industry may 
have even advocated for the capital restrictions implemented under the 
Company Act as a way to brand the industry as being a relatively safe 
investment for the general public.188  These restrictions have likely 
made it difficult for the industry to move past this emphasis on sales, as 
opposed to focusing on managerial talent in selecting optimal 
combinations of underlying instruments. 
Given the difficulties of relying on managerial skill to exceed 
benchmarks such as the S&P 500 Index, new financial innovations such 
as index funds and exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”) have eliminated the 
need for managerial talent.189  These strategies rely on computer 
programs to directly replicate the basket of securities represented by a 
particular index.190  Managers in these vehicles are not actively trading 
financial instruments, as they are instead passive monitors of the 
underlying computer models.  Professor William Birdthistle, an expert 
in investment company law, has supported this assertion by arguing that 
the recent shortcomings of the mutual fund industry have paved the way 
for the advent of ETFs.191  Because advisory fees charged to investors 
 
185. See THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES §§ 14–22 
(2014) (providing detailed description of regulatory framework for advertising by mutual funds, 
which includes applicable Company Act provisions, as well as corresponding rules and cases). 
186. John Morley, Collective Branding and the Origins of Investment Management 
Regulation: 1936–1942, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 341 (2012). 
187. Id. at 392. 
188. Id. at 391–92. 
189. Deloitte Research, Exchange-Traded Funds Challenging the Dominance of Mutual 
Funds?, DELOITTE, http://www.runtogold.com/images/Deloitte-ETF-report.pdf (last visited Sept. 
8, 2015). 
190. Id. 
191. See generally William Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded Funds: 
A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 69 (2008) 
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are necessarily lower with respect to these vehicles, mutual funds have 
been steadily losing investors to this growing category of 
investments.192 
C.  Limited Incentives of Mutual Fund Advisers: Fees 
Relatedly, advisers who manage hedge funds can earn substantially 
higher fees.  Hedge fund advisers earn both a performance fee of 
approximately 20% of profits, and a management fee of approximately 
2% of net assets.193  Mutual fund advisers are prohibited from charging 
a performance fee on the profits of a fund and are thus limited to 
earning a 1–2% management fee on net assets.194  A number of high-
profile mutual fund managers left mutual funds to manage less 
restrictive and more lucrative hedge fund investments in 2000.195  
During this time period, a handful of managers left prestigious 
Fidelity196 funds to start their own hedge fund vehicles, which at the 
time was quite controversial.197  Although this restriction on 
performance fees is designed to protect retail investors from excessive 
 
(providing a descriptive and detailed discussion on exchange-traded funds, which includes their 
structure, advantages, and shortcomings). 
192. Trevor Hunnicutt, Investors Shun Stock Pickers, Favor Vanguard, BlackRock, State 
Street, INVESTMENTNEWS (Mar. 16, 2015, 12:28 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/ 
20150316/FREE/150319936/investors-shun-stock-pickers-favor-vanguard-blackrock-state-street; 
Chuck Jaffe, Mutual Funds Lose Their Battle with ETFs, MARKETWATCH (June 11, 2011, 1:38 
PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/mutual-funds-lose-their-battle-with-etfs-2011-06-08. 
193. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Pub. No. 139, INVESTOR BULLETIN: HEDGE 
FUNDS (2012); see also JOSEPH G. NICHOLAS, INVESTING IN HEDGE FUNDS: STRATEGIES FOR 
THE NEW MARKETPLACE 165 (1st ed. 1999) (providing a brief discussion on hedge funds, which 
includes questions to ask to understand the level of risk in the fund’s investment strategies 
compared to one’s personal goals). 
194. Henry Ordower, The Regulation of Private Equity, Hedge Funds, and State Funds, 58 
AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 306 (2010); Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mffees.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2014) (providing a brief discussion 
on the various fees and expenses of mutual funds). 
195. Hedge Fund Hiring: Momentum Continues but Skills Scarce, THINK ADVISOR (Dec. 22, 
2003), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2003/12/22/hedge-fund-hiring-momentum-continues-but-ski 
lls-sc; Jennifer Karchmer, Fund Managers Move, CNNMONEY.COM (July 19, 2000 6:20 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2000/07/19/mutualfunds/q_funds_hedge/index.htm; Joseph Nocera, 
Punishing Success At Harvard, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/22 
/business/punishing-success-at-harvard.html (stating that top money managers from Harvard 
University have resigned in order to reap the benefits of the higher compensation offered by 
hedge funds). 
196. About Fidelity, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/overview (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2015) (stating that Fidelity serves “24 million individual customers . . . through 10 
regional offices and more than 180 Investor Centers in the United States.  With 40,000-plus 
associates, our global presence spans eight other countries across North America, Europe, Asia, 
and Australia who are also working tirelessly to meet the needs of our customers.”). 
197. Karchmer, supra note 195. 
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risk taking on the part of their advisers, the promise of higher fees can 
lure otherwise talented advisers into the management of private pools. 
These incentives (or the lack thereof) are compounded by the current 
regulatory climate that eases the process of organizing private funds.  
As many of the barriers of entry have recently been lifted under the 
JOBS Act, the mutual fund industry could experience a significant 
talent drain, particularly since the mutual fund investment climate is 
already subject to excessive constraints.  A recent empirical study 
investigated the extent to which mutual fund talent is being transferred 
to the hedge fund industry.198  This study found evidence of “an 
increasing flight of top-performing young managers from mutual funds 
[to hedge funds], a drop in mutual fund returns, and deterioration in 
recruiting standards.”199  Another commentator has observed: 
The hedge fund industry continues to grow rapidly.  To support this 
growth, it is gathering much of its new talent from the mutual fund 
industry.  Those mutual fund portfolio managers who are most 
interested in actually delivering superior investment performance are 
migrating to the hedge fund industry.  Hedge funds have been able to 
attract the best and the brightest—offering them significantly higher 
compensation.  A surprisingly large brain-drain has resulted, sapping 
the strength of the mutual fund industry.200 
One could argue that the new regulatory requirements provided under 
the Dodd-Frank Act create a substantial barrier to entry for private fund 
advisers.  The Dodd-Frank Act requires that private advisers register 
under the Advisers Act and report certain confidential information 
directly to the SEC.201  However, a recent survey conducted by 
Professor Wulf Kaal found that although hedge funds expressed 
concerns with these new regulatory requirements, the actual costs and 
impact of compliance are not as significant as the industry had 
originally anticipated.202  Furthermore, the potential for exponential 
profits that result from the trading flexibilities of managing such funds 
likely far exceeds the incremental costs of complying with the Dodd-
Frank Act.  These costs are also significantly less than the costs of 
complying with the Securities Act, Company Act, and Exchange Act, 
 
198. Leonard Kostovetsky, Human Capital Flows and the Financial Industry, in EFA 2009 
BERGEN MEETINGS PAPER (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1013421. 
199. Id. at 1. 
200. Rob Brown, The Death of Mutual Fund Wrap, RIA CENT. (Aug. 27, 2012), www.ria 
central.com/2012/08/27/death-mutual-fund-wrap. 
201. See Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 403, 404, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 80b–3(b) (2012)). 
202. Wulf Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 50 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 243, 315 (2013). 
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all of which provide lenient exemptions for private funds. 
III.  PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO STRATEGIES 
This Part first provides a detailed description of the specific capital 
restrictions promulgated under the Company Act.  Limitations with 
respect to leverage and derivatives trading have been implemented 
under this legislation.  Part III then identifies the inaccessible strategies 
that have been created by this framework.  Private funds can access an 
abundance of instruments and strategies that simply are unavailable to 
their mutual fund counterparts.  These strategies can often guarantee 
returns despite declining markets.  This Part concludes by assessing 
how both private adviser talent and unique relationships with 
counterparties have allowed advisers to have privileged access to 
information.  It references and summarizes numerous studies that have 
effectually proved privileged access to information for at least certain 
categories of hedge fund investments. 
A.  Mutual Fund Restrictions 
The Company Act is distinguishable from the Securities and 
Exchange acts in that it goes beyond the “truth in securities” framework 
that exclusively relies on the disclosure of material information.203  This 
legislation includes strict capital restrictions on the underlying assets of 
registered funds by prohibiting or restraining certain types of investment 
activities and transactions that are found to expose investors to undue 
risk.204  Because our country was founded upon principles of capitalism 
and free market, where businesses have the freedom to transact with 
minimal interference from the government, these kinds of restrictions 
typically elicit significant pushback from the business community.  Yet, 
the events that led to the Great Depression proved that the government 
had to play a larger role in regulating the markets to prevent the 
devastating abuses that crippled the financial system.205  In fact, these 
abuses led to a severe contraction of business in this country, which in 
turn led to widespread unemployment for millions of Americans.206  
 
203. The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
204. See generally LEMKE ET AL., supra note 185, § 8 (providing a detailed description of the 
regulatory framework underlying mutual fund capital restrictions, which includes applicable 
Company Act provisions, as well as corresponding rules and cases). 
205. See RALPH F. DE BEDTS, THE NEW DEAL’S SEC: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 7–10 (1964) 
(providing a discussion of government programs, such as the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (“ERISA”) and Social Security, which prevent risky retirement investments by 
creating strict rules to ensure that workers are guaranteed their full benefits). 
206. Id. 
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With respect to the investment company industry, the SEC estimated 
that between 1929 and 1936 “investment company shareholders lost 40 
per cent of their investments” due to various abuses that infected the 
market at that time.207  Unscrupulous advisers were found to have used 
funds as “dumping grounds” for unmarketable securities, as vehicles to 
earn excessive returns based on shoddy investments, and as an 
unlimited pool of leverage for their own personal gain.208  Many used 
the lax regulatory environment to operate funds as Ponzi schemes, 
where instead of implementing a legitimate investment strategy, 
advisers relied on new investments to fund their excessive fees.209  
Because investment companies attract a significant portion of the 
national savings from the general public, the trading activities of such 
vehicles could have a vital effect on capital formation within the 
broader economy.  Thus, these provisions are designed to mitigate the 
abuses that led to the severe losses for a wide range of investment 
company investors. 
Section 18 under the Company Act provides the basic framework for 
these restrictions.210  This provision prohibits investment companies 
from issuing “senior securities” to investors, which are defined broadly 
to include any obligation constituting indebtedness on behalf of the 
fund.211  This severely restricts the amount of debt that a fund can carry.  
For example, taking out a loan to bolster fund returns would 
automatically constitute a senior security interest as the bank 
counterparty would be offered a promissory note, bonds, or shares in 
exchange for the specified amount of the loan.212  Section 18(f), 
however, allows open-ended funds to borrow capital from a bank if, 
immediately after the bank borrowing, the fund’s total net assets are at 
least three times the total aggregate borrowings (300% asset 
coverage).213  If a fund borrows $300 for example, then it must have at 
least $900 of total assets to cover this loan.  If at any time asset 
coverage falls below 300%, the company must, within three days, 
reduce its borrowings until it has 300% coverage.214 
 
207. Paul Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Speech at U.S. Security & Exchange Commission, 
A Celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the Investment Company Act (Oct. 4, 2000) (transcript 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch405.htm). 
208. Richard M. Phillips & Robert G. Bagnall, The Investment Company Act of 1940: A Time 
For Reassessment, in 2 22ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 593, 596 (1990). 
209. Id. 
210. Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a–18 (2012). 
211. Id. § 80a–18(a), (g). 
212. Id. § 80a–18(c). 
213. Id. § 80a–18(f). 
214. Id. § 80a–18(f)(1). 
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Trading in derivatives can also constitute indebtedness and therefore 
run afoul of Section 18 of the Company Act.215  This is because in order 
to trade derivatives, parties must post margin or collateral at the outset 
of the transaction (and for the duration of the transaction), since one 
party will inevitably incur losses once the transaction closes.216  
Derivatives are not specifically defined under the federal securities 
laws, but in their most basic form, they are contracts between a future 
buyer and future seller that specify a future price at which some item 
can or must be sold.217  Common examples include forwards, futures, 
swaps, and options. 
The Company Act does provide some leeway for derivatives trading 
by registered funds.  The SEC will not automatically treat derivatives as 
senior securities provided that the adviser takes certain steps to limit the 
potential for leveraged losses by “covering” their obligations.218  Fund 
advisers can “cover” derivative contracts by earmarking or segregating 
liquid securities equal in value to the fund’s potential exposure from the 
leveraged transaction.219  Assets set aside must be liquid, 
unencumbered, and marked to market daily.220  They may not be used 
to cover other obligations, and, if disposed of, they must be replaced.221 
Advisers can also cover an obligation by directly owning the instrument 
underlying that obligation.222  For instance, a fund that wants to take a 
short position in a certain stock can comply with the Company Act by 
owning an equivalent long position in that stock.223  Thus, if a particular 
fund wants to engage in a short trade by borrowing 500 shares of 
Microsoft, which has a total value of $5000, the fund can maintain 
appropriate coverage by directly owning 500 shares of Microsoft, or by 
segregating liquid assets in the amount of $5000 until it repays its 500 
shares of Microsoft.  These transactions must also be closely monitored 
by boards of directors and funds must consistently assess accuracy and 
completeness of their disclosure relating to derivatives.224 
 
215. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 185, § 8(b)(ii). 
216. Id. 
217. MICHAEL DURBIN, ALL ABOUT DERIVATIVES 3 (2006). 
218. Securities Trading Practices of Registered Investment Companies, 44 Fed. Reg. 25,132 
(April 27, 1979) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 271 (2015)). 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Dreyfus Strategic Investing & Dreyfus Strategic Income, SEC Staff No-Action Letter 
(June 22, 1987). 
223. Id. 
224. Securities Trading Practices of Registered Investment Companies, 44 Fed. Reg. at 
25,133. 
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These exemptions allow advisers to allocate a portion of fund assets 
to derivative instruments, but they are still considerably restrictive.  
Maintaining a large portion of cash reserves to cover any and all 
potential losses, as briefly discussed above, is simply not a viable 
investment scheme for most vehicles.  The majority of fund assets 
should be invested in specific instruments as opposed to sitting in an 
earmarked account.  As such, these stringent requirements make it 
difficult for advisers to rely on derivatives as a primary component of 
their strategies and they are often used for narrow hedging purposes.  
Derivatives such as futures and forwards can be used to lock in various 
exchange rates, to guarantee that a particular interest rate will be at a 
certain amount at a specified date in the future, or for a number of other 
peripheral strategies.225  Some advisers rely on derivatives to a greater 
extent to mimic the absolute return strategies of many private funds.226  
Yet, the general effectiveness of these strategies is quite limited due to 
the restrictions provided under Section 18 of the Company Act.227 
In addition, illiquid instruments such as distressed securities, venture 
capital, private equity, and other private investments are largely 
unavailable to public funds.  The SEC recommends that registered 
investment companies limit such illiquid investments to a maximum of 
15% of a fund’s total Net Asset Value (“NAV”)228 so that funds can 
easily honor investor redemption requests on a daily basis.229  When 
advisers receive redemptions, the adviser must be able to quickly sell a 
proportionate amount of mutual fund assets in order to fulfill the request 
in a timely fashion.230  Thus, underlying assets must be sufficiently 
liquid in order to fund any and all investor redemptions.  Maintaining 
this flexibility is likely rooted in investor protection, as ensuring that 
investors can quickly exit a fund protects them from having their capital 
locked within a particular vehicle for an extended period of time. 
Many funds further limit illiquid investments to an even lower level 
than the allowable 15% due to challenges in complying with the 
 
225. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 185, §8(b)(iii). 
226. Simeon Hyman, Hedge Funds for the Masses?  Hedge Fund Strategies Are Showing Up 
in More Mutual Funds, USNEWS (June 10, 2013, 9:35 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/ 
blogs/the-smarter-mutual-fund-investor/2013/06/10/hedge-funds-for-the-masses. 
227. Id. 
228. Periodic Repurchases by Closed-End Management Investment Companies, Securities 
Act Release No. 33,6948, Exchange Act Release No. 34, 30967, 57 Fed. Reg. 34,701 (July 28, 
1992). 
229. Id. 
230. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(b) (2015); see also Invest Wisely, supra note 138 (“Mutual fund 
investors can readily redeem their shares at the current NAV—plus any fees and charges assessed 
on redemption—at any time.”). 
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mandated valuation mechanisms provided under the Company Act.231  
More specifically, since there are no readily available market quotations 
for illiquid instruments, advisers must value them at their “fair value as 
determined in good faith by the board of directors.”232  The process 
through which fair value is determined is often subjective and complex.  
Boards can be overly conservative in valuing illiquid instruments, incur 
additional expenses in valuing such assets due to their underlying 
complexities (which get passed down to the investors), or are exposed 
to the risk of liability for mispricing a particular asset.233 
The capital restrictions described above, have narrowed the universe 
of available strategies for public funds.  Mutual fund strategies are 
largely restricted to the following three categories of investments: 
equities, bonds, and cash instruments.  Managerial talent can only go so 
far when advisers are limited to this constrained pool of options.  This 
has arguably paved the way for ETFs to increasingly dominate the 
mutual fund landscape as these passive strategies often mirror the 
basket of securities represented by an index.  Given the massive 
financial innovation that has occurred over the past decades, coupled 
with the growing flexibilities afforded to private funds, it is increasingly 
troubling that the general public has been excluded from a variety of 
investments and strategies since the passage of the federal securities 
laws. 
B.  Inaccessible Strategies 
Private investment companies that effectively maintain exemptions 
from the Company Act are not shackled by this restrictive legislation.  
Congress made it easier to maintain such exemptions when it adopted 
Section 3(c)(7) in 1996.234  Under this provision, funds that restrict their 
offerings to “qualified purchasers” are automatically exempt from the 
act.235  This exemption quickly became the most popular amongst 
private fund advisers as it allows them to raise an unlimited amount of 
capital and still offer interests to an unlimited number of qualified 
purchasers.  Conceptually, qualified purchasers are similar to accredited 
 
231. Sam Diedrich, ‘Alternative’ or ‘Hedged’ Mutual Funds: What Are They, How Do They 
Work, and Should You Invest?, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2014, 10:29 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/samdiedrich/2014/02/28/alternative-or-hedged-mutual-funds-what-are-they-how-do-they-wo 
rk-and-should-you-invest; Eleanor Laise, Mutual Funds Delve into Private Equity, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE (Aug. 2, 2006), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/businessnews/2006/08/02/Mut 
ual-funds-delve-into-privateequity/stories/200608020156. 
232. Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a–2(41)(B)(ii) (2012). 
233. See generally Roye, supra note 207. 
234. Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a–3(c)(1), (7). 
235. Id. § 80a–3(c)(7). 
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investors insofar as income or institutional status or both are used as 
primary determinants.  But qualified purchasers are subject to higher net 
worth requirements.236  While individual investors must earn over 
$200,000 in order to qualify as accredited, a qualified purchaser 
includes institutions that own at least $5,000,000 in investments as well 
as any natural person who owns not less than $5,000,000 in 
investments.237  If funds restrict offerings to these high net worth 
investors then they are afforded more flexibility to invest in a wider 
range of instruments than registered investment companies.  
Theoretically, these freedoms arise from the notion that these kinds of 
investors do not need the investor protection measures mandated under 
our federal securities laws.  They can adequately fend for themselves 
and can therefore bear the increased risk of investing in assets that 
perhaps yield less predictable results. 
The greater investment freedoms afforded to private funds are often 
implicit in their commonly known monikers.  With respect to hedge 
funds, the term “hedge” refers to the fact that advisers can use a variety 
of strategies in order to aggressively hedge, or protect, their portfolios 
against market losses, which is a strategy not available to mutual 
funds.238  For example, a hedge fund adviser could simultaneously take 
long and short positions in the same type of instrument, without having 
to comply with the Section 18 restrictions provided above, in order to 
ensure a return in both high and low markets.239  Because hedge funds 
are not subject to constraints on leverage240 or derivatives trading,241 
such advisers can rely on a plethora of exotic instruments, illiquid 
investments, and non-U.S. opportunities, so as to maximize investor 
returns.  Hedge funds are frequently the leaders in extracting the 
benefits of financial innovation as they attract the best managerial talent 
to take advantage of these broad liberties.  They are habitually described 
as having the ability to earn “absolute returns” which means that they 
seek to guarantee returns irrespective of market performance.242  
 
236. Id. § 80a–2 (51). 
237. Id. 
238. NICHOLAS, supra note 193, at 15. 
239. Id. 
240. Leverage Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/leverage.asp 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (defining leverage as “the use of various financial instruments or 
borrowed capital, such as margin, to increase the potential return of an investment”). 
241. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE 
FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 12 (Apr. 28, 
1999).  The amount of leverage employed by a particular hedge fund is only limited to the extent 
requested by its actual counterparties.  Id. 
242. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 60, at 33–36 (explaining several investment 
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Strategies include market neutral, global macro, opportunistic, emerging 
markets, and distressed securities.243 
With respect to private equity and venture capital funds, these 
vehicles typically invest in an assortment of private companies and 
investments.  These can include start-ups, leveraged buyouts, mezzanine 
financing, and distressed companies, among others.244  Because private 
fund advisers are not obliged to fulfill daily redemption requests, and 
are even able to suspend redemptions at their election, they can invest in 
instruments that are highly illiquid as investor subscriptions can be 
locked into private vehicles for an extended period of time.245  
Moreover, because exempt vehicles are not subject to the mandated 
valuation constraints provided under the Company Act, advisers have 
complete discretion to utilize internal valuation policies, without being 
subject to the independent oversight of a board of directors.246  Private 
fund advisers are also exempt from the standardized valuation policies 
mandated under the Company Act,247 and they can deviate from any 
provided valuation policies when deemed necessary.248  Such 
flexibilities allow private funds to invest in a variety of illiquid 
instruments without facing the same liability risks as mutual fund 
boards. 
A common investment for private equity and venture capital funds is 
restricted shares, which are exclusively offered by private companies 
such as the pre-IPO Facebook or Microsoft.  Generally speaking, 
restricted shares are considered illiquid because they are not publicly 
traded on active exchanges, making it more difficult to appropriately 
derive consistent and reliable valuations.  Although restricted shares are 
typically offered at a discount relative to post-IPO offerings,249 they are 
largely unavailable to mutual fund advisers due to the difficulties in 
producing “fair value” determinations, and mandated SEC limitations 
described herein.  This allows private fund advisers to exclusively enjoy 
 
strategies that hedge funds utilize to generate returns in various market conditions). 
243. Dion Friedland, Synopsis of Hedge Fund Strategies, MAGNUM FUNDS, 
http://www.magnum.com/hedgefunds/strategies.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
244. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 75, §12. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. See Ryan Sklar, Hedges or Thickets: Protecting Investors from Hedge Fund Managers’ 
Conflicts of Interest, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3251, 3268 (2009). 
248. Id. at 3268–69. 
249. Dr. Janet Kilholm Smith et al., The SEC’s ‘Fair Value’ Standard for Mutual Fund 
Investment in Restricted Shares and Other Illiquid Securities, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
421, 439 (summarizing empirical evidence that finds “on average the discounts [of private 
placement shares] relative to registered shares is substantial”). 
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the informational advantages that are often attributed to being an early 
investor in private companies. 
For instance, many commentators alleged that private investors in 
Facebook, who purchased restricted shares before the company went 
public, wrongfully reaped the benefits of having inequitable access to 
information related to the company’s true valuation with respect to its 
ongoing technological developments.250  These elite investors were able 
to cash out their investments when the IPO price reached its peak, while 
the general public suffered massive losses due to inaccurate disclosures 
related to Facebook’s valuation.251  As one commentator noted: “The 
early bird gets the cheap stock; the late bird gets the bird.”252  
According to the Private Equity Quarterly Index (“PrEQIn”), private 
equity funds, on average, have outperformed the markets over the past 
ten years.253  The exclusion of public investors from the private 
placement market is becoming less justifiable particularly with the 
development of private exchanges such as SecondPost and the 
NASDAQ Private Market, which are making restricted shares a more 
liquid investment.254 
The diversity of instruments and strategies available to private funds 
is astounding compared to the narrow universe offered to the general 
public.  Modern portfolio theory dictates that maintaining a diverse 
basket of investments is essential for optimizing investor returns.255 
Given the inequitable structure of our federal securities laws, elite 
investors disproportionately reap the benefits of this assorted selection 
of both short-term and long-term investments.  Mutual fund advisers are 
admittedly required to maintain a diverse basket of securities under the 
 
250. Henry Blodget, The Full Story Of How Facebook IPO Buyers Got Screwed, BUS. 
INSIDER (Dec. 20, 2012, 1:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-facebook-ipo-investors-
got-screwed-2012-12?op=1; Aswath Damodaran, Was Facebook’s Botched IPO a Conspiracy?, 
CNN (May 28, 2012, 11:51 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/28/opinion/damodaran-facebook-
ipo/index.html; Elizabeth Ody & Margaret Collins, Facebook IPO Seen Deepening Investor 
Distrust of Stocks, BLOOMBERG (May 25, 2012, 11:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2012-05-25/facebook-ipo-fallout-deepens-investor-distrust-of-stocks.html. 
251. See generally Blodget, supra note 250; Damodaran, supra note 250; Ody & Collins, 
supra note 250. 
252. Robert Lezner, The Facebook IPO Proves The New Rule That Private Markets Trump 
Public Markets, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2012/08/19/ 
the-facebook-ipo-proves-the-new-rule-that-private-markets-get-the-best-deal. 
253. 2014 PREQIN GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT, supra note 73, at 7. 
254. See generally Rodrigues, supra note 38 (discussing recent emergence of exchanges for 
private shares). 
255. Charles Rotblut, The Benefits of Modern Portfolio Theory, AAII J., 
http://www.aaii.com/journal/article/the-benefits-of-modern-portfolio-theory.touch (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2015). 
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Company Act and the Internal Revenue Code.  Yet numerous 
commentators have noted the valid limitations of simply diversifying 
among publicly traded stocks in terms of maximizing returns and 
minimizing risks.  As one prominent hedge fund adviser noted: 
Hedge funds strive to generate returns that have a very low correlation 
with traditional asset classes . . . .  Meaning, that those asset classes 
with diverse correlations will not all react in the same manner to 
market conditions . . . .  Since many well-managed hedge funds act 
independently of market movements, they often have the ability to 
stabilize a portfolio during times of market uncertainty.  This may be 
the strongest argument for giving hedge funds a significant role in 
your asset allocation.  Whereas mutual funds provide a certain degree 
of diversification by investing in multiple stocks, they are still subject 
to cyclical, sector and asset class volatility and overall market 
declines.256 
By and large, private funds have the power to invest in assets that are 
negatively correlated to publicly traded stocks.257  When market indices 
experience volatility due to financial crises or other economic shocks, a 
portfolio that includes a sizable allocation to private funds can maintain 
smoother returns.258 
During the Great Recession, certain hedge funds relied on their 
increased freedoms to engage in short trading and other innovative 
strategies to actually beat the market.259  In some cases, private funds 
were able to earn a sizable return for their underlying investors when 
the general public suffered average losses of over 40%.260  The global 
macro funds managed by George Soros gained 5% during the lowest 
points of the financial crisis.261  As Professor Houman Shadab has 
noted in his often-cited research, “[h]edge funds use short sales and 
derivatives to manage risk and reduce losses when the overall market is 
performing poorly.  This practice is difficult for mutual funds because 
the legal restrictions on their investment activities.”262  Consequently, 
more institutional investors, such as endowment trustees for 
 
256. Advantages & Disadvantages of Hedge Funds, MORTON CAPITAL MGMT., https://web. 
archive.org/web/20141029110940/http://www.mortoncapital.com/advantages-of-hedge-funds 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
257. Id. 
258. Id. 
259. Houman Shadab, Hedge Funds and the Financial Crisis 3 (Mercatus on Policy, Working 
Paper No. 24, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1564847. 
260. See generally Shadab, supra note 259. 
261. Richard Teitelbaum, Soros Imitators Reap Riches in Financial Crisis on Macro Funds, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4, 2009, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive& 
sid=ay.jqGduLoH8. 
262. Shadab, supra note 259, at 2. 
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universities, have been increasingly allocating a sizable portion of assets 
to private funds.263 
However, reports have recently surfaced that contrary to the 
aforementioned data, hedge funds, similar to their mutual fund 
counterparts, are not able to beat the markets and have historically 
failed to exceed the S&P 500 Index.264  Such conflicting reports likely 
result from the different methodologies used to measure hedge fund 
returns, as private fund advisers are not required to employ standardized 
valuation mechanisms.  Private fund indexes are also naturally 
underinclusive, as these entities are not mandated to report performance 
results to any existing index.  Publicly available indexes primarily rely 
on voluntary reporting from private funds.  Analyzing average returns 
across the industry is also problematic because private funds are 
extraordinarily heterogeneous. Some funds mirror conservative 
strategies comparable to mutual funds, while others pursue innovative 
strategies that invest in exotic instruments and strategies.265  A more 
useful comparison would account for the wide range of strategies 
utilized by private funds, and would also consider the extent to which 
performance results are negatively correlated to the markets that could 
actually enhance the diversity of an existing portfolio. 
Mutual funds are beginning to offer hedge fund-like strategies to 
recruit investors who want to enjoy the benefits of alternative 
investments, but they are still significantly limited in their investment 
capabilities.266  Because of the constraints provided under the Company 
Act, mutual fund advisers cannot engage in the same level of 
 
263. Diversification Beyond Stocks, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/05/ 
021105.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
264. Simon Lack, The Hedge Fund Mirage: The Illusion of Big Money and Why It’s Too Good 
to Be True, CFA INST. CONF. PROC. Q., Dec. 2012, at 14–17, http://www.cfapubs.org/ 
doi/pdf/10.2469/cp.v29.n4.4 (arguing that on average, hedge funds have not been able to exceed 
the risk-free rate of return provided by government issued treasury bills).  But see generally 
Thomas Schneeweis & Hossein B. Kazemi, An Academic Response to the ‘Hedge Fund Mirage,’ 
INST. FOR GLOBAL ASSET & RISK MGMT. (Sept. 30, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228851 
(providing a direct critique of the methodologies employed by the author of Hedge Fund Mirage: 
“The author of ‘Hedge Fund Mirage’ does not have the net profits to hedge funds but such data is 
required before true comparisons between net profit to investor and net profit to hedge fund 
manager can be made . . . .”). 
265. FILIPO STEFANINI, INVESTMENT STRATEGIES OF HEDGE FUNDS 2 (2006). 
266. William Conroy, A Look At Hedge-Fund-Style Mutual Funds, FIN. ADVISOR (June 25, 
2014), http://www.fa-mag.com/news/build-a-better-mousetrap—and-the-world-will-beat-a-path-
to-your-door-18405.html; Rob Copeland, The New Hedge-Fund-Like Retail Funds, WALL ST. J 
(Mar. 21, 2014, 5:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230328780457944513 
4053667514; Sam Mamudi, Hedge Funds for the Masses, MKT. WATCH (Mar. 19, 2010, 7:29 
PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/hedge-fund-like-mutual-funds-bid-for-your-money-201 
0-03-19. 
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derivatives trading and other innovative investments.  In addition, they 
do not have the same flexibility to react quickly to unforeseen market 
swings.  SEC officials have also started to investigate whether these 
new products expose retail investors to increased harm.267  This could 
perhaps deter public advisers from delving into these unique strategies 
as the SEC may decide to implement more restrictive regulations. 
C.  Information 
In addition to having privileged access to strategies, private fund 
advisers often have privileged access to valuable information related to 
such strategies.  The tremendous value of information has been recently 
illuminated by Michal Lewis’s bestselling commentary, Flash Boys, 
where he shed light on the evolution of high-frequency trading 
(“HFT”).268  HFT generally refers to the practice of relying on complex 
algorithms to greatly accelerate the speed through which traders can 
exploit informational gaps.269  Traders who gain access to the most 
speed will essentially be the most profitable.  Such timing advantages 
are now measured in terms of milliseconds as technology continues to 
rapidly evolve to produce higher speeds of transmitting data.270  For 
those who do in fact develop the best technology in this regard, they 
reap enormous profits because of the riskless nature of being first-in-
line.  In fact, Tactical Trading Fund, a HFT hedge fund managed by 
Chicago-based Citadel Investment Group, has increased in value by 
over 300% since it opened its doors in 2007.271 
Historically, the value of information has largely driven the structure 
of our federal securities laws.  Transparency is the cornerstone of this 
intricate legal framework as issuers must publicly disclose all material 
information related to an offering.272  This sweeping requirement 
originates from the efficient market hypothesis, which broadly asserts 
that any public information regarding a security will be immediately 
impounded into its price.273  Mandating the disclosure of all material 
 
267. Trevor Hunnicutt, Popular Liquid Alts Funds Face Regulatory Scrutiny: As Assets in 
Retail Alternative Funds Balloons Regulators Probe Risks and Marketing, INVESTMENTNEWS  
(June 24, 2014), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20140624/FREE/140629964. 
268. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014). 
269. High-Frequency Trading—HFT, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/ 
high-frequency-trading.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
270. Eamon Javers, High-Speed Trading: Profit—and Danger—in Milliseconds, CNBC (May 
15, 2012, 3:31 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/47432428. 
271. Citadel High-Frequency Trading Fund Up 300% Since Debut, FIN. ALTERNATIVES (Apr. 
15, 2014, 12:25 PM), http://www.finalternatives.com/node/26756. 
272. DE BEDTS, supra note 205, at 48. 
273. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 168. 
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information will thus ensure that the underlying prices of securities are 
in effect accurate.  As background, issuers of public companies must 
provide a detailed registration statement upon issuing new offerings to 
the general public.274  This document includes comprehensive 
descriptions of the offering’s financial terms, management history, key 
risk factors, audited financial statements, and a number of other relevant 
items.275  Once this registration statement is filed and deemed effective, 
companies must then submit public filings for any new material 
developments that are not reflected in the initial registration 
statement.276  Companies that are registered under the Exchange Act 
must also file periodic reports on an annual and quarterly basis.277  A 
variety of traders and other market participants quickly react to this 
steady flow of information that is mandated under the federal securities 
laws, as well as to information that is regularly released by unrelated 
third parties.  Through this immediate reactionary time, which has 
grown faster over the years, the prices of publicly traded securities 
rapidly incorporate publicly released information. 
To guarantee that investors are not given an unfair advantage by 
having privileged access to new information, insider trading is 
prohibited under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.278  The specific 
contours of the insider trading laws are beyond the scope of this Article, 
but corporate insiders such as executives and employees are generally 
restricted from trading on private information before disclosing it to the 
general public.279  Relatedly, such insiders cannot provide material 
nonpublic information to a family member or friend without potentially 
running afoul of the insider trading laws.280  Regulation FD also 
prohibits issuers from engaging in selective disclosure to certain 
covered persons, which include individuals and entities likely to trade 
on the information, such as broker-dealers, securities analysts, 
 
274. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g–77aa (2012). 
275. Id. 
276. Id. 
277. See generally Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 147. 
278. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). 
279. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980). 
280. Dirks v. SEC., 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (“[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the 
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the 
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.”); United States v. 
Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 2014) (clarifying that in order for a tippee to face liability, 
such tippee needs to have direct knowledge of the personal benefit that the tipper sought to 
acquire in disclosing the material non-public information, which has arguably made it easier for 
tippers to evade liability under the insider trading laws). 
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investment advisors, and institutional investors.281  Prohibiting these 
kinds of trading practices encourages participation in the public capital 
markets by ensuring that the markets are fair and efficient.  If investors 
believe that they are allocating their limited capital to a rigged market 
which serves the interests of a privileged few, then they are less likely 
to purchase shares. This would in turn constrain the overall liquidity of 
the public capital markets. 
This Article does not broadly assert that private fund advisers are 
knowingly and consistently violating the insider trading laws by 
wrongfully profiting from nonpublic information.  However, such 
advisers often possess higher degrees of talent and technology to 
process freshly released information, than their mutual fund 
counterparts.  This builds on the discussion provided in Part IV.B, 
which describes the industry’s exclusive access to strategies.282  One 
could argue that private fund advisers have more information regarding 
the markets as a whole due to their exclusive access to a number of 
instruments.  Financial innovation has expanded the interconnectedness 
of such markets, as the intricate relationship between derivatives, 
securities, illiquid investments, fixed income products, and a number of 
others, have correlative properties that are often exploited via arbitrage 
by private funds.  What happens on one corner of a particular 
derivatives market will inevitably impact an innocuously related corner 
of the securities markets.  Furthermore, the insider trading laws that 
apply to derivatives are not as well developed, or stringent, as the laws 
that apply to securities.283  This is compounded by the risk that the 
loosening restrictions for private funds could lead to an ongoing talent 
drain in the mutual fund industry, which could further constrain the 
potential returns for mutual fund investors. 
Relatedly, this exclusive access to instruments can foster more 
involved relationships with broker-dealers and other counterparties.  
These relationships can yield privileged access to new developments 
regarding various financial products and entities.  As background, 
private funds depend on prime brokers for a host of services such as 
“centralized custody, clearing and settlement, financing, and 
 
281. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100; id. § 243.103. 
282. See infra Part IV.B. 
283. See, e.g., Gary Rubin, CFTC Regulation 1.59 Fails to Adequately Regulate Insider 
Trading, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 599, 610–18 (2009) (highlighting limitations of applying insider 
trading doctrine to commodities instruments since these markets are not generally governed by 
corporate insiders such as CEOs, employees, and other categories of executives; further 
identifying the limitations of CFTC 1.59 which attempts to prohibit insider trading by governing 
members of commodities exchanges). 
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recordkeeping.”284  Hedge fund advisers frequently trade higher 
volumes of instruments than publicly registered funds, which produces 
higher commissions for their prime broker counterparties.  Private funds 
can be a highly sought-after client for these large brokerage houses.  In 
a similar vein, counterparties may feel inclined to divulge valuable 
information to private funds to garner positive ratings, which could then 
boost their compensation and lead to increased future business.285 
A number of empirical studies have found evidence of privileged 
access to information.286  One such study compared publicly released 
analyst reports to hedge fund holdings disclosed in Form 13F filings.287  
This statistical comparison showed that hedge funds were 
opportunistically adjusting their positions prior to the release of a 
publicly available analyst reports.288  For instance, if an analyst 
published a downgrade for a particular company, a hedge fund would 
decrease its holdings in such company immediately prior to the release 
of such public statement.  This study found no evidence that other 
institutions, such as banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds, also 
trade prior to analyst recommendations.289  Another study investigated 
the extent to which hedge funds were front running the announcement 
of merger and acquisition (“M&A”) deals.290  This study found that 
certain hedge funds were increasing their holdings in a target’s stock 
while decreasing holdings in an acquirer’s stock (or buying put options), 
prior to the public announcement of the underlying M&A deal.291  This 
 
284. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 75, § 1. 
285. April Klein et al., Do Hedge Funds Trade on Private Information?  Evidence from 
Upcoming Changes in Analysts’ Stock Recommendations 6–7 (Apr. 7, 2014), http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2421801. 
286. See, e.g., Nadia Massoud et al., Do Hedge Funds Trade on Private Information?  
Evidence from Syndicated Lending and Short-Selling, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 477, 477–98 (2011) 
(finding that a number of hedge fund participants in syndicated lending deals are short-selling 
equity of borrowers before loan originations are publicly announced); David H. Solomon & 
Eugene F. Soltes, What are We Meeting For?  The Consequences of Private Meetings with 
Investors, 58 J. L & ECON (forthcoming 2015-16) (finding that hedge fund advisers who meet 
privately with management make more profitable trading decisions than other categories of 
investors as a result of those meetings); Meng Gao & Jiekun Huang, Capitalizing on Capitol Hill: 
Informed Trading by Hedge Fund Managers (June 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1707181## (finding evidence that hedge fund managers gain an informational 
advantage in securities trading due to connections with lobbyists). 
287. Klein et al., supra note 285, at 6. 
288. Id. at 3. 
289. Id. at 4. 
290. See generally Rui Dai et al., Hedge Funds in M&A Deals: Is There Exploitation of 
Private Information?, (Jan. 11, 2011), (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs 
tract_id=1742641) (explaining how hedge funds abuse private insider information by disclosing 
before the announcement of a merger or acquisition). 
291. Id. at 6. 
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strategy proved to be very profitable for this subset of funds.292 
The implications of these studies are indeed debatable.  Some results 
can be attributed to heightened skill in processing information, and 
others may imply that private fund advisers are systematically engaged 
in illegal insider trading activities.  Attributing the appropriate causes to 
these clearly identifiable results is an admittedly difficult task.  Even 
still, acknowledging that private funds have exclusive access to 
information regarding a broad spectrum of financial instruments is 
important for assessing the adverse impacts of the current regulatory 
climate.  As this industry continues to grow, the general public will face 
growing inequities in terms of access to strategies, as well as access to 
information that is integral to understanding the increasing 
interconnectedness of the markets. 
IV.  BROADER IMPLICATIONS 
This Part sheds light on the broader implications of the growing 
inequities discussed herein.  For the most part, retail investors are facing 
unique financial challenges, some of which include dwindling 
retirement accounts and declining property values.  These challenges are 
likely adding to the unfortunate disappearance of the middle class.  
Creating a framework that allows elite investors to have 
disproportionate access to a variety of strategies and information could 
potentially aggravate these issues and further deepen the already 
embarrassing income gap between the wealthy and the average investor. 
A.  Unique Financial Challenges Facing Retail Investors 
Easing the regulatory burdens for private funds seems to embody one 
of the primary goals of the current regulatory climate.  Academics have 
even called into question the underlying meaning of the term “public” 
as the JOBS Act, and other regulatory reforms, have gradually chipped 
away at the boundary between public and private vehicles.293  Despite 
the fact that these increased freedoms could facilitate capital formation 
in the broader economy, they will inevitably lead to even greater 
inequities between elite and average investors.  Professor Gubler 
identifies this phenomenon as the “crowding out” of the retail 
investor.294  He specifically states that “[a]s the private securities 
market expands, the retail investor is crowded out, and the model of 
 
292. Id. 
293. See generally Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 147; Hillary A. Sale, The New 
‘Public’ Corporation, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (2011). 
294. Gubler, supra note 24, at 799–801. 
MARTIN SHELBY (315-368).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2015  5:16 PM 
2015] Privileged Access to Financial Innovation 361 
democratic capitalism that has defined the American corporate 
landscape for nearly a century is upended.”295  The fact that retail 
investors are often excluded from a massive and growing market that 
could greatly improve portfolio diversification, as well as access to 
information related to mutual fund investments, seems to undercut 
notions of freedom and equity implicit in a free market economy. 
The regulatory justification for this divide is rooted in investor 
protection principles, as the law recognizes that the general public may 
not have the financial acumen or the resources to appropriately protect 
themselves against riskier investments.  Yet, as the private industry 
continues to grow and extend its reach to the general public, albeit 
indirectly through systemic risk and retailization, these investor 
protection rationales become less convincing.296  Given the exponential 
growth of the private fund industry, if a systemic risk event should 
occur with respect to a private fund, or a group of private funds, the 
entire economy would be at risk.297  This Article does not suggest that 
investor protection should be completely disregarded for the sake of 
expanding investment opportunities for the general public.  Rather, it 
asserts that inequitable opportunities should be systematically 
researched by a variety of disciplines, particularly since the economic 
conditions facing retail investors are dire. 
As retail investors face dwindling retirement and savings accounts, an 
increasing retirement age, and decreasing property values, the 
disparities created by this divide become more problematic and more 
difficult to justify.  Several politicians and commentators have 
highlighted the growing woes for middle class Americans, even when 
such families come from two-income households.298  The Great 
Recession annihilated the retirement income for the general public as 
millions of 401(k) accounts, which largely depend on mutual fund 
 
295. Id. 
296. See generally Martin, Private Investment Companies, supra note 37 (discussing the 
extent to which investor protection principles have been undermined by the sophisticated investor 
exemption). 
297. Andrew Lo, Professor, Mass. Inst. Tech., Written Testimony for the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 8–11 (Nov. 13, 2008) 
(transcript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1301217). 
298. See generally ELIZABETH WARREN & AMEILIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME 
TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS PARENTS ARE GOING BROKE (2003); Jan Diehm & Katy Hall, 
Middle Class Jobs, Income Quickly Disappearing, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/06/middle-class-jobs-income-_n_3386157.html; Roger 
Runningen, Obama Highlights Middle-Class Struggles, Stalled Congress, BLOOMBERG NEWS 
(July 30, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-30/obama-highlights-middle-class-
struggles-stalled-congress.html (asserting that President Obama has routinely advocated to 
increase support for the disappearing middle class). 
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investments, rapidly declined in value.  Some estimates have found that 
the Great Recession “reduced the median balance in 401(k)s by a third 
between 2007 and 2008.”299  According to a recent Gallop poll, 59% of 
Americans have identified retirement as their highest financial 
concern.300  Moreover, close to 25% of the workforce has postponed 
their retirement and 61% are saving little to nothing.301  They are 
essentially living paycheck to paycheck.302  It is also questionable 
whether the government-funded social security program is sustainable 
in the long run, which is compounded by the fact that by 2040, there 
will be approximately 40 million additional senior citizens living in the 
United States.303 
B.  Growing Income Gap 
While most of the American population is facing heightened financial 
struggles, the top earners are doing quite well.  Popular discourse has 
recently shed light on the embarrassing yet increasing income gap 
between the wealthy and the average earner in this country.  According 
to one study instituted by Emmanuel Saez of the University of 
California, Berkeley, the “top 1 percent [of earners] captured 93% of the 
income gains during the first year of recovery from the [Great 
Recession].”304  On average, “more than half [of nation’s income gains 
accrue] to the richest 1 percent [of the nation while] . . . over 6 percent 
of national income accru[es] to the top .01 percent of families.”305  
These top earners predominantly include company executives/managers 
and financial company executives/managers.306  Hedge fund managers 
are often the top earners in this group.307  Professor Thomas Piketty 
 
299. JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON 
MADE THE RICH RICHER AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 30 (2010). 
300. Kate Rogers, Fewer Americans Plan to Rely on 401(k) Plans in Retirement, FOX BUS. 
(May 6, 2014), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2014/05/06/fewer-americans-plan-
to-rely-on-401k-plans-in-retirement. 
301. Laura Bassett, Dwindling Retirement Savings ‘Undiscussed Explosive Bomb’ Of 
Recession, HUFFINGTON POST (July 30, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/30/ 
dwindling-retirement-savi_n_665484.html. 
302. Id. 
303. Peter G. Peterson, WILL AMERICA GROW UP BEFORE IT GROWS OLD? HOW THE 
COMING SOCIAL SECURITY CRISIS THREATENS YOU, YOUR FAMILY, AND YOUR COUNTRY 23 
(1996). 
304. Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States, 
http://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2013.pdf (last updated Jan. 25, 2015). 
305. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 299, at 17. 
306. Id. 
307. See generally Nathan Vardi, The 25 Highest-Earning Hedge Fund Managers And 
Traders, FORBES (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2014/02/26/the-high 
est-earning-hedge-fund-managers-and-traders/ (discussing the large sums of money earned by 
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likewise provides an in-depth economic analysis of both the scale and 
the drivers of this growing income gap.308  He examined historical data 
from over twenty countries, spanning across the past two centuries, to 
find that the main contributor to these disparities is the troubling trend 
of returns on capital exceeding total economic growth.309  He 
specifically states: 
The inequality r [return on capital] >g [growth] implies that wealth 
accumulated in the past grows more rapidly than output and wage.  
This inequality expresses a fundamental logical contradiction.  The 
entrepreneur inevitably tends to become a rentier, more and more 
dominant over those who have nothing but their labor.  Once 
constituted, capital reproduces itself faster and faster than output 
increases.  The past devours the future.310 
The implications of these disparities are a widely contested topic.  On 
one end of the spectrum, economists have found that they are a natural 
result of economic growth, and that aggressively advocating for equality 
can actually reduce overall efficiency, weaken incentives to work, and 
mitigate future innovations.311  Economists on the opposite end of this 
debate have found that such disparities can lead to slower economic 
growth, less stable expansions, and political unrest.312  A 2011 study 
instituted by Andrew G. Berg and Jonathan D. Ostry of the International 
Monetary Fund came to similar conclusions.313  They found that “[t]he 
difference between countries that can sustain rapid growth for many 
years or even decades and the many others that see growth spurts fade 
quickly may be the level of inequality. Countries may find that 
improving equality may also improve efficiency, understood as more 
sustainable long-run growth.”314  From a social and psychological 
perspective, others have found that severe income disparities can lead to 
“cycles of entitlement for the affluent and an acceptance of less 
equitable outcomes by the poor”315 and that “[w]ealthy individuals are 
more likely to break traffic laws and cheat at games.”316  Despite where 
 
certain hedge fund managers in 2013). 
308. See PIKETTY, supra note 33, at 15 (explaining the methodology used in the author’s 
research). 
309. Id. 
310. Id. at 571. 
311. See generally ARTHUR OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975). 
312. Annie Lowrey, Costs Seen in Income Inequality, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2012, at B1. 
313. Andrew G. Berg & Jonathan D. Ostry, Equality and Efficiency, 48 FIN. & DEV., Sept. 
2011. 
314. Id. 
315. Sethi, supra note 38, at 798. 
316. Scientists Study the Negative Effects of Income Inequality, PBS (June 25, 2013), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/daily_videos/scientists-study-the-negative-effects-of-income-
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one falls on this spectrum, growing inequities tend to be unsustainable 
and they can actually harm capital formation in the long run.317 
The causes of the financial dilemmas facing retail investors, as well 
as the causes of the growing income gap, are admittedly complex.  
Inequitable tax rates,318 excessive executive pay,319 and technological 
innovation,320 are a few of the contributing factors that have been 
researched by commentators across disciplines.  It is also difficult to 
immediately draw a direct correlation between the structure of our 
federal securities laws, and the increasing divide between the wealthy 
and the average earner.  However, this Article should at least 
demonstrate that more research is needed in this regard.  At face value, 
it seems unsettling to encourage a regulatory system where top earners 
have access to even greater capital gains through private investments, 
while the general public is left with investments that are subpar.  Mutual 
fund strategies account for an extremely narrow portion of the universe 
of available strategies within the broader financial sector.  This 
inequitable access will continue to grow, as the current regulatory 
climate will lead to an even greater expansion of the private fund 
industry.  The extent to which these private investments simply agitate 
the problematic conclusion derived by Professor Piketty, in that returns 
on capital exceed economic growth, likewise needs to be further 
researched.  Certain private vehicles could be utilizing strategies that do 
not promote overall economic growth by encouraging naked speculation 
and other problematic innovations.  This is yet another hotly contested 
topic that warrants additional investigation. 
 
inequality/. 
317. See generally STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND 
THE CASE FOR AN ECONOMIC RULE OF LAW (N.Y. Univ. Press, 2014) (arguing that the 
concentration of political and economic power among the “super” elite, particularly in the context 
of the recent subprime mortgage crisis, can actually nullify the positive aspects of capitalism in 
the long run). 
318. THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42729, TAXES AND THE 
ECONOMY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TOP TAX RATES SINCE 1945, at 16 (2012), 
(“[C]hanges over the past 65 years in the top marginal tax rate and the top capital gains tax rate 
do not appear correlated with economic growth.  The reduction in the top tax rates appears to be 
uncorrelated with saving, investment, and productivity growth.  The top tax rates appear to have 
little or no relation to the size of the economic pie.”). 
319. Roberto A. Ferdman, The Pay Gap Between CEOs and Workers Is Much Worse than You 
Realize, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/ 
2014/09/25/the-pay-gap-between-ceos-and-workers-is-much-worse-than-you-realize/. 
320. Philippe Aghion et al., Innovation and Top Income Inequality 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper 21247, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2617607 (“[T]he rise in top income shares is partly related to innovation-led growth, where 
innovation itself fosters social mobility at the top through creative destruction.”). 
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CONCLUSION: STUCK BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE 
Crafting a viable solution highlights the unique challenges of 
applying a reliable cost-benefit analysis to new regulations in light of 
the growing complexities of the financial markets.  For example, 
loosening the antiquated trading restrictions that apply to mutual fund 
investments would allow advisers to employ strategies that could further 
protect investors in declining markets.  This would create better 
opportunities for wealth maximization and diversification for the 
general public.  And because mutual funds are subject to the detailed 
registration requirements under the Company Act (and other 
enhancements under the Dodd-Frank Act), retail investors would still be 
given appropriate investor protections through mandated disclosures 
and other heightened governance requirements.  These provisions could 
also serve to mitigate systemic risk as the resulting transparency can 
“weed out” speculative activities that are in fact harmful to the 
economy. 
However, the costs to market integrity and investor protection could 
be monumental.  Contrary to the previous assertion, loosening these 
restrictions could also increase the collective levels of speculative 
trading activity, which in itself is difficult to appropriately quantify.  
John Bogle, a notable expert in the mutual fund industry, has insistently 
noted the risks of increasing speculation in the broader economy.321  
Exclusively profiting from the short-term prices movements in 
instruments, as opposed to making long-term investments in companies, 
could arguably compromise economic growth.  Moreover, increased 
flexibilities granted to mutual fund advisers could result in heightened 
litigation costs with respect to insider trading violations if advisers do in 
fact gain increased access to information. 
Alternatively, specific limitations could be imposed on private funds’ 
leverage exposure and related derivatives trading activities.  This would 
level the playing field for retail investors and simultaneously reduce 
systemic risk as excessive leverage could expose the general public to 
substantial harms.  Nevertheless, the costs of limiting such activities 
could unduly constrain capital formation.  This is further complicated 
by the fact that pension funds and other institutional investors (that are 
comprised of underlying retail investors) are increasingly investing in 
these vehicles.  Choosing appropriate caps would also seem like an 
arbitrary endeavor as it is not clear that our regulators have sufficient 
expertise to properly assess the long-term impacts of such a 
 
321. See generally JOHN C. BOGLE, THE CLASH OF THE CULTURES: INVESTMENT VS. 
SPECULATION (2012) (arguing that excessive speculation can divert capital from its optimal use). 
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monumental change.  Enforcing such caps could be problematic as well, 
because the SEC and the CFTC are already faced with limited 
resources. 
There is a plethora of both doctrinal and empirical research that 
supports both of these positions, each of which are rooted in a rich 
history of legal and economic theories.  But much of this research is 
limited by a pervasive lack of coordination regarding the broad 
spectrum of areas that are implicated by these complex and evolving 
issues.  This is particularly troubling because this area produces a large 
volume of new regulations on an annual basis, and the SEC, as well as 
Congress, is required to incorporate a cost-benefit analysis before 
adopting each rule.  In the event of a financial crisis, Congress hurriedly 
produces corrective legislation to quiet public uproar.  As a result, it is 
often unclear whether the legislation is closely tailored to the problems 
at hand.  Furthermore, lawyers are often limited in their overall 
knowledge of the financial markets, even though they are the primary 
drafters and enforcers of new and existing rules.  For instance, Bernie 
Madoff evaded the SEC for years despite the SEC being tipped off by a 
whistleblower and being subsequently registered under the Advisers 
Act.322 
In order to effectively incorporate a reliable cost-benefit analysis in 
the context of minimizing the inequities discussed herein, a greater 
effort must be undertaken by our regulators to aggressively study these 
issues from the perspective of a wide range of experts (e.g., legal, 
economic, financial, banking, quantitative analysis, etc.).  The SEC 
made recent improvements in this area when it created the Division of 
Economic and Risk Analysis (“DERA”) in September 2009.323  This 
division was designed to “integrate financial economics and rigorous 
data analytics into the core mission of the SEC”324 and it “relies on a 
variety of academic disciplines, quantitative and non-quantitative 
approaches, and knowledge of market institutions and practices to help 
the Commission approach complex matters in a fresh light.”325  The 
DERA is also comprised of the Office of Asset Management which 
“[p]rovides economic and other interdisciplinary analysis in support of 
the Commission on issues related to the regulation of investment 
advisers, investment companies, hedge funds, and other institutional 
 
322. Robert Chew, A Madoff Whistle-Blower Tells His Story, TIME (Feb. 4, 2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1877181,00.html. 
323. About Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/dera/Article/about.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
324. Id. 
325. Id. 
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investors.”326  Creating this division has undoubtedly assisted the SEC 
in exploring these emerging developments from a variety of 
perspectives.  Heightened coordination is needed particularly with 
respect to private actors in the private fund industry to deepen the 
SEC’s familiarity with innovative products and strategies.  This 
heightened coordination could perhaps happen through an intensive 
study conducted through the DERA.  From an even broader perspective, 
a greater commitment by law schools to further develop the curricula 
related to financial regulation should also be undertaken.  This would 
further ensure that new lawyers are exposed to these pertinent issues at 
earlier points in their careers. 
In addition, the SEC has only partial jurisdiction over the instruments 
traded by investment funds.  The SEC has direct jurisdiction to 
supervise the securities industry,327 and the CFTC is authorized to 
supervise the bulk of the derivatives industry.328  Investment companies 
that trade in both securities and derivatives must therefore comply with 
the arduous registration requirements of these two separate regimes.  
This creates several inefficiencies in producing optimal regulation and 
has even been identified as a culprit in failing to foresee numerous 
financial crises.329  As these two industries have become increasingly 
interwoven,330 both agencies must combine their resources to develop 
an optimal solution for the growing inequities facing retail investors.  
This could perhaps be accomplished through the creation of a joint 
advisory commission of the SEC and the CFTC, comprised of experts 
from both the public and private sectors.  This commission would be 
committed to the ongoing task of collecting and studying information 
related to the financial markets, in an effort to enhance the factors that 
are used to implement an effective cost-benefit analysis. 
Overall, the importance of these issues should be duly noted and 
further researched by a variety of disciplines.  Financial innovation has 
been expertly mined by a growing private industry while antiquated 
regulations have excluded retail investors from many of the resulting 
benefits.  These inequities will only serve to further aggravate the 
 
326. Id. 
327. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, 
and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
328. Mission and Responsibilities, U.S. COMMODITIES FUTURES COMM’N, http://www.cftc. 
gov/About/MissionResponsibilities/index.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
329. Jerry Markham, Merging the CFTC and SEC—Clash of Cultures, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 
537, 572 (2009). 
330. Id. at 587. 
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already dire financial challenges facing the average investor.  The need 
for effective regulations that minimize the costs incurred to both 
individual investors and society at large is pressing.  The markets have 
grown exceedingly complex and developing sound regulations, as 
opposed to regulations that simply serve the highest bidder or that are 
passed in haste to quiet public uproar, will inevitably entail enhanced 
coordination between the SEC and the CFTC, and improved 
collaboration with related industries (e.g., economic, financial, banking, 
quantitative analysis, etc.).  These suggestions, of course, necessitate 
further analysis and will likely form the basis for my future research. 
 
